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The Role of Models and Probabilities
in the Monetary Policy Process 
This is a paper on the way data relate to decisionmaking in central
banks. One component of the paper is based on a series of interviews
with staff members and a few policy committee members of four central
banks: the Swedish Riksbank, the European Central Bank (ECB), the
Bank of England, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. These interviews
focused on the policy process and sought to determine how forecasts
were made, how uncertainty was characterized and handled, and what
role formal economic models played in the process at each central bank.
In each of the four central banks, “subjective” forecasting, based on
data analysis by sectoral “experts,” plays an important role. At the Federal
Reserve, a seventeen-year record of model-based forecasts can be com-
pared with a longer record of subjective forecasts, and a second compo-
nent of this paper is an analysis of these records.
Two of the central banks—the Riksbank and the Bank of England—
have explicit inﬂation-targeting policies that require them to set quantita-
tive targets for inﬂation and to publish, several times a year, their
forecasts of inﬂation. A third component of the paper discusses the effects
of such a policy regime on the policy process and on the role of models
within it.
The large models in use in central banks today grew out of a ﬁrst
generation of large models that were thought to be founded on the statisti-
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probability-based theory of inference. The models are now fit to data by
ad hoc procedures that have no grounding in statistical theory. A fourth
component of the paper discusses how inference using these models
reached this state and why academic econometrics has had so little impact
in correcting it. Despite their failure to provide better forecasts, their lack
of a ﬁrm statistical foundation, and the weaknesses in their underlying
economic theory, the large models play an important role in the policy
process. A ﬁnal component of the paper discusses what this role is and
how the model’s performance in it might be improved.
The Policy Process
At all four central banks the policy process runs in a regular cycle; that
cycle is quarterly in frequency at all except the Federal Reserve, where it
is keyed to the meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
which take place roughly every six weeks. Each central bank has a pri-
mary macroeconomic model but uses other models as well. The primary
models are the ones used to construct projections of alternative scenarios,
conditional on various assumptions about future disturbances or policies
or on various assumptions about the current state of the economy. Where
there is feedback between models and subjective forecasts, it is generally
through the primary model.
The primary models have some strong similarities. The ECB’s model
contains about ﬁfteen behavioral equations, the Bank of England’s
twenty-one, the Riksbank’s twenty-seven, and the Federal Reserve’s
about forty.1 Each has at least some expectational components, with the
Federal Reserve and Riksbank models the most complete in this respect.
Those central banks whose models are less forward-looking describe
2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
1. The ECB model equations are laid out in Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001), and the
Bank of England’s in Quinn (2000). The Riksbank model is said to be nearly identical to
the QPM model of the Bank of Canada, which is described in Poloz, Rose, and Tetlow
(1994), Black and others (1994), and Coletti and others (1996). The Federal Reserve’s
model is described on a World Wide Web site that provides linked equation descriptions
and a set of explanatory discussion papers. This material was made available to me for the
research underlying this paper and is available from the Federal Reserve Board to other
researchers on request.
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including more forward-looking behavior.
The Riksbank and the Bank of England have publicly described
“suites” of models of various types, including vector autoregressive
(VAR) models, smaller macroeconomic models, and optimizing models.
Some of these models produce regular forecasts that are seen by those
involved in the policy process, but at both central banks none except the
primary model has a regular, well-deﬁned role. The other central banks
also have secondary models with some informal impact on the policy
process.
Each policy round proceeds through a number of meetings, through
which a forecast is arrived at iteratively, but the number of meetings and
the way discussions are ordered vary. At the Riksbank there is a start-up
meeting, at which forecasts from two large models are presented, fol-
lowed by another meeting at which the sectoral experts (of which there
are fourteen, with nearly everyone on the monetary policy staff responsi-
ble for at least one sector) present their views and relate them to the
model. At a third meeting the staff’s report is put together. Following that
meeting, an editorial committee consisting of three to ﬁve people rewrites
the report into a form suitable for issue as a policy statement by the board.
At this stage and earlier there is some feedback from the policy board,
intended to avoid sharp divergences between its views and those of the
staff.
At the Bank of England each policy round involves six or seven meet-
ings—fewer than until recently—and some policy board members attend
the meetings from the earliest stages. This may reﬂect the unusually high
proportion of graduate-trained economists on the policy board (the Mone-
tary Policy Committee, or MPC). All of the discussion of projections and
policy choices occurs within the framework of the primary model, known
as the Macroeconomic Model (MM). When a section of the model is
overridden, that is done through residual adjustments, and as a result large
residuals become a check on such model revisions.
At the ECB participation in the process is limited primarily to the staff
until the late stages. The process begins with the gathering of projections
and assessments of current conditions from the European national central
banks. As at other central banks, sectoral experts play a major role, and
the primary model (the Area-Wide Model, or AWM) is used to generate
residuals corresponding to the expert forecasts. Twice a year a more
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staff are represented on the forecast committee and forecasts are devel-
oped through iterations with the national central banks as well as between
sectoral experts.
At the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the policy process
(known as the Green Book process) begins with meetings among a group
of about four staff members to set the “top line”: forecast values for GDP
growth and for certain key ﬁnancial variables, including the federal funds
rate. At the next stage the sectoral experts generate forecasts for the vari-
ables for which they are responsible. Their forecasts are fed through the
primary macroeconomic model (called FRB/US) to generate residuals,
and the results of this exercise are considered at a subsequent meeting.
Feedback can occur between model forecasts and subjective forecasts and
vice versa, as well as back to the top line numbers.
Federal Reserve staff emphasized to me (and it may be true at the other
central banks as well) that the expert subjective forecasters have econo-
metric input well beyond that in the primary model residuals. The sectoral
experts generally have one or more small econometric models of their
own sectors, and often these are more sophisticated than the correspond-
ing equations in FRB/US. The Federal Reserve has an explicit policy of
maintaining the forecast as purely a staff forecast, not allowing any policy
board participation in the meetings that go into forecast preparation.
Each of the central banks prepares more than just a single forecast. The
Federal Reserve probably does the most along these lines: recent Green
Books show as many as a dozen potential time paths for the economy,
corresponding to varying assumptions. The staff see these scenarios as a
concrete way of indicating what uncertainty there may be about their fore-
cast, despite the absence (most but not all of the time) of stochastic simu-
lations in their analysis. The Bank of England also formulates forecasts
reﬂecting alternative scenarios as a way of indicating uncertainty. Its
inﬂation reports regularly publish forecasts reﬂecting one or more main
minority views on the MPC and a forecast conditioned on the time path of
interest rates implied by current conditions in ﬁnancial markets. It also
publishes its main forecasts as fan charts: graphs that show, as shaded
regions, regions of numerically labeled higher and lower probability for
the future time path of a variable.
All the central banks discussed here except the Federal Reserve condi-
tion their forecasts on an assumption of constant interest rates. This is a
4 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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the model they use, the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM), was built
around an assumed policy reaction function. If the interest rate is truly left
constant, the model explodes. If instead it is left constant for one or two
years and modeled with the reaction function thereafter, it jumps at the
transition date and causes strange behavior. To avoid these problems, the
Riksbank simply uses the time path of long-term interest rates generated
from a model run with the reaction function in place, even though the
short-term rate is set on the constant-rate path. The inﬂation-targeting
central banks are no doubt concerned that a time path for interest rates
that is not ﬂat might, if published, be given too much weight by the mar-
kets and might be seen as a commitment by the central bank. On the other
hand, the ECB, which does not publish its staff forecasts, nonetheless
uses the constant-interest-rate assumption, justifying it as a response to
the wishes of the policy board.
Forecasting at the Federal Reserve
How well does the Federal Reserve Board staff forecast? The conclu-
sion of this paper, which largely matches that of Christine Romer and
David Romer,2 is that the Federal Reserve forecasts quite well indeed,
especially inﬂation. This section goes beyond Romer and Romer by 
—extending their sample, which went through 1991, to 1995 or 1996
—considering data on the Federal Reserve’s internal, model-based
forecasts as well as data on their Green Book forecasts 
—applying some analytical methods that may give additional insight
into the nature of the Federal Reserve’s forecasting advantage, and 
—speculating on the implications of these results, in part based on my
interviews with the staff, along lines that only partially match the
Romers’ discussion. 
The Data
Before each meeting of the FOMC, the staff prepares a forecast, which
is presented in the Green Book. This forecast is labeled “judgmental.” In
September 1995, to cite one example, it included forecasts for ﬁfty-three
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ables in the early 1980s. The forecasts include estimates for the current
quarter and projections for future quarters; over the period 1979–95 the
time span of these forecasts varied from four to nine quarters. (Informa-
tion about more recent forecasts is unavailable, because Green Book fore-
casts remain undisclosed for ﬁve years.) A “model-based” forecast is
prepared at the same time. Until 1995 these forecasts were based on the
MPS model, an economy-wide model originally developed as an aca-
demic collaboration but afterward maintained by the Federal Reserve
Board staff.3 Since 1995 the model used for these forecasts has been the
new FRB/US model, created within the Federal Reserve. These model
forecasts are archived in machine-readable form and were made available
to me for this study. Their public use is, as I understand it, restricted only
by the same ﬁve-year disclosure rule that governs the Green Book fore-
casts. The data for the MPS model forecasts that I have used, and for the
FRB/US model forecasts as the ﬁve-year blackout window advances in
time, will be available to researchers upon request to the Federal
Reserve’s research department.
This paper also considers forecasts from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). This survey, begun in 1968 as a project of the American
Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research,
was taken over in 1990 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Data
from this survey are available at the Philadelphia Fed’s website.
Because some of the analyses in this section are greatly simpliﬁed by
having data of uniform frequency, all the data have been converted to
quarterly form. The SPF is quarterly to start with. FOMC meetings occur
at least once each quarter, but with nonuniform timing within the quarter.
Dean Croushore of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has created
and published on the Philadelphia Fed’s website a quarterly series of
Green Book forecasts, constructed by taking the FOMC meeting date
closest to the middle of each quarter. Those data are used in this study.
The MPS model forecasts have been put in quarterly form by matching
their dates to the Croushore quarterly FOMC dates.4
6 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
3. The abbreviation stands for MIT-Penn-SSRC, the three institutions that collaborated
in its development (the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Pennsyl-
vania, and the Social Sciences Research Council).
4. The Romers chose to convert their data to monthly form instead, ending up with data
sets with nonuniform timing. For their regression analyses this created no great analytical
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real GDP growth and inﬂation measured using the GDP deﬂator; values
for the latter are those in the most recently available chain-weighted data.
The Romers instead used the second revision, which appears with about a
one-quarter delay. Subsequent revisions are often substantial, as are the
differences between chain-weighted and ﬁxed-weight series. However,
there is an argument for targeting a near-term revision as “actual,” as the
Romers did. Interest in the forecasts and their inﬂuence on decisions is
greatest in the months immediately surrounding the forecasts; hence
errors as perceived at that time are probably closest to what enters the
forecasters’ own loss functions. It also seems unfair to penalize forecast-
ers for “errors” that arise because an “actual” series is based on a different
accounting concept than the series the forecasters were in fact projecting.
On the other hand, the Romers have already considered actual values
deﬁned this way, and there is insight to be gained from a different
approach.
The most recent revisions should, after all, be the best estimates of the
actual historical path of the economy. Arguably, one should not penalize a
forecaster for failing to forecast a recession that disappears in later revised
data, or for predicting growth that actually occurred but was not recog-
nized until the data were revised a year or two later. The chain-weighted
data, although not available at the time most of the forecasts considered
here were made, have a claim to be more accurate than the ﬁxed-weight
data available for most of the historical period I study. On these grounds,
then, it is worth knowing whether analysis of forecasting performance is
sensitive to whether one measures “actual” outcomes as second revisions
or as the latest revisions of the most recently developed accounting con-
cepts. That this study ﬁnds results very similar to those of the Romers sup-
ports the comforting conclusion that sustained patterns of forecast
accuracy or inaccuracy are not sensitive to the details of data deﬁnitions.
Characterizing Inﬂation Forecast Accuracy
Table 1 shows the root mean square errors of four inﬂation forecasts
over the period (forecasts made in 1979–95) for which all four are avail-
Christopher A. Sims 7
difﬁculty, and it let them preserve more of the information in the original data set. This
paper’s VAR-based analysis of the marginal contribution of Green Book forecasts in the
presence of other variables would be complicated by nonuniform time intervals in the data.
1017-01 BPEA/Sims  12/30/02  14:48  Page 7able. In addition to the SPF, Green Book, and MPS model forecasts, a
“naïve” forecast (of no change in inﬂation from the current period) is pre-
sented. As the ﬁrst column of the table shows, the forecasts made in real
time have substantial error even in determining current-quarter inﬂation,
for which data are available only with a delay. The naïve forecasts are
therefore not naïve at all for the current quarter and are probably an unre-
alistic standard even one quarter ahead, because of the information advan-
tage they reﬂect. At two or more quarters ahead, the Green Book and MPS
forecasts, but not the SPF forecast, are better than the corresponding naïve
forecast. The best nonnaïve forecast, uniformly for horizons of one quar-
ter through four quarters, is the Green Book forecast. On the other hand,
the differences between forecasts do not seem large, especially between
the MPS model and the Green Book.
The similarity of the inﬂation forecasts is also apparent in the correla-
tion matrices shown in table 2. Indeed, the forecasts are in general more
strongly correlated among themselves than they are with the actual data.
Figure 1 illustrates the same point, showing the four-quarter-ahead fore-
casts and the actual data tracking each other closely. A similar plot for
one-quarter-ahead forecasts would be even more tightly clustered.
On the other hand, when actual inﬂation is regressed on the forecasts as
in Romer and Romer, the results are similar to theirs (table 3): the coefﬁ-
cients on the Green Book forecasts are large and signiﬁcant, even exceed-
ing 1 at the one-year horizon, whereas those on the other forecasts are
insigniﬁcant or even negative.
8 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
Table 1. Root Mean Square Errors of Naïve, Survey-, and Model-Based Inﬂation
Forecasts, 1979–95
Percentage points
Quarters after the current quarter
Forecast 0 1 2 3 4
Naïvea 0.00 0.94 1.15 1.14 1.35
SPFb 0.80 1.02 1.22 1.41 1.54
Green Bookc 0.96 0.91 0.92 0.99 1.16
MPSd 1.10 1.08 1.16 1.10 1.24
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Forecast is the same rate of inﬂation as in the current quarter.
b. Average of forecasts reported by the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
c. Forecast prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve for use in deliberations of the Federal Open
Market Committee. 
d. Forecasting model developed by researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Pennsylvania,
and the Social Sciences Research Council for use by the Federal Reserve.
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Table 2. Correlations between Naïve, Survey-, and Model-Based Inﬂation Forecasts
and Actual Inﬂation, 1979–95a
Correlation coefﬁcients
Forecast SPF Green Book MPS Actual inﬂation
Four quarters ahead
Naïve 0.9079 0.9336 0.8937  0.8324 
SPF 0.9530 0.9106  0.8117 
Green Book 0.9528  0.8877 
MPS 0.8486 
One quarter ahead
Naïve 0.9488 0.9327 0.9091  0.9170 
SPF 0.9539 0.9282  0.9212 
Green Book 0.9494  0.9458 
MPS 0.8963 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
a. See table 1 for deﬁnitions. Inﬂation is measured by the annualized quarterly change in the logarithm of the chain-weighted
GDP deﬂator.
Figure 1. Four-Quarter-Ahead Forecasts of Inﬂation, 1979–95
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mation content” of forecasts, following Ray Fair and Robert Shiller, who
were probably the ﬁrst to use this language to characterize this sort of
regression.5 Although the regression provides useful information if inter-
preted carefully, it is probably misleading to think of it as characterizing
“information content.” Clearly these inﬂation forecasts in some sense have
very nearly the same “content,” because they are so highly correlated.
Consider two different models of how forecasts might be related to
each other and to actual outcomes. Let f be the vector of forecasts and y
the outcome. One possible model is 
with the elements of the ft vector independent of each other and of εt.
Then the coefﬁcients in the γ vector, squared, would be direct measures of
the accuracy of the elements of ft, and they would be estimated properly
by a least squares regression.
Another extreme possibility, however, is that all forecasters have noisy
observations on a single “forecastable component” of y, which they may
() , 1 ytt t =+ γε f
10 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
5. Fair and Shiller (1989).
Table 3. Regressions of Actual on Forecast Inﬂation, 1979–95a
Four-quarter-ahead One-quarter-ahead 
forecasts forecasts
Regression Standard Regression Standard 
Forecast coefﬁcient errorb coefﬁcient errorb
SPF –0.4882 0.30683 0.2677  0.1596 
Green Book 1.2564  0.32340 0.7750  0.1578 
MPS 0.0444 0.23511 –0.0652 0.1231 
Constant 0.3447 0.61875 –0.4221 0.2553 
Summary statistics:
R2 0.8009 0.9750
Standard error of the estimate  0.9751 0.7472
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. See table 1 for deﬁnitions.
b. Standard errors account for third-order moving-average, or MA(3), serial correlation. 
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ponent of y, we have the model
with Ω diagonal and f* orthogonal to ε and ν.
In this framework the quality of a forecast is related inversely to the
variance σ2
i of the corresponding εi(t) and to the deviation of its λi coefﬁ-
cient (from the diagonal of the Λ matrix) from θ. It can be shown that this
model implies that the estimated regression coefﬁcients in equation 1 will
all be positive and proportional to λi/σ2
i. If some forecasts have very small
σ2
i values, the relative sizes of coefﬁcients can be extreme, then, even
though the forecasts have very similar forecast error variances. Note that
the coefﬁcients are not proportional to the forecast error variances, which
include a perhaps dominant contribution from the variance of ν; the coefﬁ-
cients are inversely proportional to the relative idiosyncratic εi variances,
even if these are an unimportant component of overall forecast error.
Interpretation of the regression coefﬁcients becomes even more prob-
lematic if we admit the possibility of a second component of common
variation, namely, a “common error.” This can be allowed for by making
f*(t) two-dimensional, with the second element of θ set to zero. This
enables the second element of f*(t) to account for similar ﬂuctuations in
the forecasts that are unrelated to the actual outcome. When there is a
common component of error, the regression coefﬁcients in models like
those of table 3 can be extreme, even though the common component of
error is small and very similar among the forecasts. To see this, suppose
the idiosyncratic component ε(t) is negligibly small, while 
() () () () .
* 7 1 yt t t =+ f ν
() () () ()
** 6 21 2 2 ft ft t =+ λ f
() () () ()
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* 3 yt f t t =+ + ϕθ ν
() () () ()
* 2 f tf t t =+ + δε Λ
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and f2 in a regression like equation 1 or the regressions in table 3 will be
λ2/(λ2 – λ1) and –λ1/(λ2 – λ1). Thus the coefﬁcients will tend to be of
opposite sign, with the difference between them growing as the forecasts
become more similar (λ1 →λ 2).
The coefﬁcients of equation 1, estimated by least squares, do always
retain the interpretation of being estimates of the weights in the most
accurate forecast that could be constructed as a linear combination of the
elements of f(t). What we have seen here is that these weights have no
reliable relation to individual forecast quality as measured by root mean
square error. It is not a good idea, then, to limit the analysis of forecast
quality to an examination of this sort of regression. It is necessary to go
further in examining the correlation structure of the forecasts.
Despite its simplicity, the model of equations 2 and 3 approximates
well the actual properties of the forecasts examined here. Table 4 shows
estimates of this model, for one- and four-quarter-ahead forecasts. The
coefﬁcients on f* in the tables have been normalized to make the coefﬁ-
cient in the “actual” equation equal to 1, and the constant terms have been
converted to deviations from the constant term in the “actual” equation,
so that they become measures of forecast bias. The model attributes the
low root mean square error of the Green Book forecasts entirely to their
low idiosyncratic error. Both the naïve and the MPS model forecasts have
lower bias at both short and long horizons, with the lower MPS bias par-
ticularly pronounced at the one-quarter horizon.
The model ﬁts very well at the four-quarter horizon and fairly well at
the one-quarter horizon. For the four-quarter forecasts, the standard like-
lihood ratio (LR) χ2 test accepts the null hypothesis that the model is cor-
rect at a marginal signiﬁcance level of 0.743, if we ignore the serial
correlation inherent in the overlapping forecasts. The serial correlation
would almost certainly imply greater variability in the sample covariances
and hence even less evidence against the null. For the one-quarter-ahead
forecasts, a standard LR test of the model against an unconstrained model
rejects the null at a marginal signiﬁcance level of 0.013, but the Schwarz
criterion, which credits simpler models for having fewer parameters and
provides consistent model selection, favors the restricted model. The fore-
casts have slightly fat-tailed distributions (two or three residuals, out of
sixty-eight, are more than 2.5 standard deviations); if we accounted
explicitly for nonnormality, this would probably further weaken any evi-
12 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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cance levels, the sample size at which the conventional LR test would
become “signiﬁcant” at the 0.05 level and at which the Schwarz criterion
would start to favor the larger model, assuming that the data moment
matrices were held constant as the sample size was increased. This per-
haps provides a better index of how sensitive results might be to serial
correlation and nonnormality.
Since there is uncertainty both about the bias and about the variances
of the forecasts, it is interesting to ask how much evidence there is against
the hypothesis that the better root mean square error of the Green Book
forecasts reﬂects only sampling error. This can be checked by ﬁtting the
bivariate mean and covariance matrix parameters for a pairing of the
Green Book errors with another model’s errors, with and without the con-
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Table 4. Estimates from One-Factor Model for Inﬂation Forecastsa
Four-quarter-ahead forecast One-quarter-ahead forecast
Fore- Variance    Fore- Variance
castable of Constant castable of    Constant
component forecast term component forecast term
Forecast (f *) error (σ2) (bias) (f) error (σ2) (bias)
Naïve 1.1505 0.6740 0.3738 1.0195 0.4493 0.0765
SPF 0.8235 0.2372 0.9222 0.8714 0.2028 0.4990
Green Book 1.0794 0.0094 0.6143 1.0566 0.1712 0.4906
MPS 0.9818 0.3377 0.5058 1.0609 0.5021 0.0309
Actual 1.0000 0.9511 0.0000 1.0000 0.4729 0.0000
inﬂation
Summary statistics:
Log likelihood –6.3542 –6.4929
Unconstrained  –6.3061 –6.3868
log likelihood
T for χ2 = 0.05b 115 53
T for Schwarz  438 99
criterion
T of actual  68 68
sample
σ for actual  2.12 2.2811
inﬂation
µ for actual  3.6768 3.9741
inﬂation
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. Results are from estimation of the model described in equations 2, 3, and 4 in the text. 
b. T is the sample size at which the discrepancies between the theoretical and the sample covariance matrices would be statis-
tically signiﬁcant.
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i +σ ii is the same, where µi is the bias
(the mean forecast error) and σii the forecast error variance. Table 5 shows
the results of such tests. For the comparison of the Green Book with the
MPS model, likelihood values with and without the equal-root-mean-
square error restriction are similar, and the sample sizes T that would be
required to make these differences favor rejecting the equal-root-mean-
square hypothesis are correspondingly large. For the Green Book–to–SPF
comparison, however, the opposite is true. The evidence for the superior-
ity of the Green Book forecast over the SPF forecast is strong, whereas
that for the superiority of the Green Book forecast over the MPS model
forecast is weak.
The results here and in the Romer and Romer paper may appear to con-
ﬂict sharply with those reported by Andrew Atkeson and Lee Ohanian.6
They claim to ﬁnd that econometric model forecasts are much worse than,
and Green Book forecasts no better than, a simple naïve model for fore-
casting inﬂation. However, their contrasting results arise entirely from
having restricted their sample to 1984–99, a period when inﬂation was
very stable. The naïve model they consider forecasts average inﬂation
over the next year as the average inﬂation rate over the preceding year.
During the 1979–83 period, such a model, because it has a half-year lag
during a period when inﬂation rose and fell rapidly, performs very badly,
worse than a naïve model that uses the previous quarter’s inﬂation. Atke-
son and Ohanian also measure actual outcomes as one-year average inﬂa-
tion rates rather than as one-quarter inﬂation rates. This is not the source
of their contrasting results; I have veriﬁed that their type of naïve forecast
produces almost the same root mean square error as the Green Book fore-
casts when it is applied to forecast one-quarter inﬂation rates four quarters
ahead over 1984–95. But it is substantially worse, at both short and long
horizons, than any of the other forecasts considered in this paper when
applied to the entire 1979–95 period.
Characterizing GDP Forecast Accuracy
From table 6 it is immediately clear that the advantage of the Green
Book over other forecasts is much smaller for output growth than for
inﬂation, and that the SPF forecasts look much better for this variable.
14 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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longer horizon (table 7). The Romer-style regressions shown in table 8
still indicate a substantially larger coefﬁcient on the Green Book than on
other forecasts, but now the differences among coefﬁcients, although
large, are statistically insigniﬁcant. Table 9 shows that, despite its gener-
ally top-ranked performance, in forecasting output growth the Green
Book forecast has only a statistically negligible advantage over either the
SPF or the MPS model. These results might at ﬁrst seem to run counter to
the fact that in table 7 the correlation of the Green Book forecast with
actual outcomes is higher than that of the SPF forecast with actual out-
comes. But correlations ignore forecast bias, and they ignore failures of
the forecast to be scaled properly. The point of the equal-root-mean-
square-error test is to account for the impact of these sources of error,
along with correlations. Apparently the Green Book does a respectable
job at output forecasting but lacks the advantage over the MPS model and
private sector forecasts that it has for inﬂation forecasting.
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Table 5. Assessing Evidence against Equal Root Mean Square Errors for Inﬂation
Four-quarter-ahead One-quarter-ahead 
forecast forecast
MPS v.  SPF v.  MPS v. SPF v.
Statistic Green Book Green Book Green Book Green Book
Log likelihood difference 0.0079 0.1605 0.0264 0.2837
T for χ2 = 0.05 243 12 73 7
T for Schwarz criterion  534 26 160 15
T of actual sample 68 68 68 68
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 6. Root Mean Square Errors of Naïve, Survey-, and Model-Based Output
Growth Forecasts, 1979–95a
Percentage points
Quarters after the current quarter
Forecast 0 1 2 3 4
Naïve 0.00 3.61 4.09 4.39 4.58 
SPF 2.46 2.93 3.09 3.37 3.12 
Green Book 2.38 2.89  3.07  3.20  3.02 
MPS 2.69 3.05 3.16 3.43 3.24 
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. See table 1 for deﬁnitions. 
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The preceding analysis conﬁrms the Romers’ conclusion that the
Green Book forecasts are very good compared with private and naïve
forecasts. They have also been historically slightly better than the Federal
Reserve’s model-based forecasts, although the margin of superiority is
statistically thin. Where does this superiority come from? 
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Table 7. Correlations between Naïve, Survey-, and Model-Based Output Growth
Forecasts and Actual Output Growth, 1979–95a
Correlation coefﬁcients
Green 
Forecast SPF Book MPS Actual
Four quarters ahead
Naïve –0.1444 0.2605 0.2437 0.0180 
SPF 0.2871 0.2819 0.2498 
Green Book 0.8230  0.4191 
MPS 0.3216 
One quarter ahead
Naïve 0.5365 0.5114 0.4004 0.3850 
SPF 0.8863 0.7503 0.4664 
Green Book 0.8210  0.5047 
MPS 0.4411 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
a. See table 1 for deﬁnitions.
Table 8. Regressions of Actual on Forecast Output Growth, 1979–95a
Four-quarter-ahead One-quarter-ahead 
forecasts forecasts
Regression Standard Regression Standard 
Forecast coefﬁcient errorb coefﬁcient errorb
SPF 0.4853 0.4130 0.3289 0.4664
Green Book 1.4133 0.6112 0.4744 0.4813
MPS –0.1857 0.4054 0.1224 0.3057
Constant –1.5002 1.3170 0.7366 0.5523
Summary statistics:
R2 0.1967 0.2626
Standard error of the estimate 3.0278 2.8802
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. See table 1 for deﬁnitions.
b. Standard errors account for MA(3) serial correlation.
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Book inﬂation forecasts in VAR models. I consider three somewhat
extreme hypotheses: 
—that the Federal Reserve is simply making better use than other fore-
casters of the same collection of aggregate time series available to all 
—that its forecasting advantage comes entirely from its knowledge,
unavailable from published time series, of its own likely policy actions, or 
—that the Fed is simply collecting better detailed information about
price developments, so that if other forecasters had knowledge of actual
inﬂation one quarter ahead, its forecasts would not be useful to them. 
One can formulate each of these possibilities as restrictions on a VAR
model; the last two gain some support from the data.
The ﬁrst hypothesis suggests that if Federal Reserve forecast data are
added to a VAR containing a list of standard quarterly variables known to
be useful in forecasting, the Federal Reserve forecasts should not con-
tribute substantially to the VAR’s ﬁt. Of course, because the VAR uses ex
post data for quarter t in constructing forecasts for quarter t + 1, it has an
unfair advantage over the Federal Reserve forecasts, which are made at t
without even preliminary data on many values for that quarter. If it turned
out that Federal Reserve forecasts are indeed insigniﬁcant contributors to
a VAR, it would be necessary to take careful account of this bias, but in
fact the result seems to point in the opposite direction. The Green Book
forecasts make substantial contributions to the ﬁt of a standard quarterly
VAR, as table 10 shows. The coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant in two of
the ﬁve equations (those for the GDP deﬂator and the federal funds rate);
the χ2(5) statistic computed from the coefﬁcient estimates and their esti-
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MPS v.  SPF v.  MPS v. SPF v.
Statistic Green Book Green Book Green Book Green Book
Log likelihood difference 0.024094 0.009275 0.010729 0.000000
T for χ2 = 0.05 80 207 179 ∞
T for Schwarz criterion  175 455 393 ∞
T of actual sample 68 68 68 68
Source: Author’s calculations.
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strengthen the probability that they are nonzero.7 Table 10 shows that the
posterior odds calculated from the standard priors and equal prior proba-
bilities on the models favor inclusion of the Green Book forecasts in the
VAR with 5 to 2 odds. This odds ratio is probably the best measure of the
strength of the evidence. It is not decisive in itself, but because the use of
ex post current data puts the Green Book forecasts at a disadvantage, the
fact that the odds ratio favors the Green Book forecasts is a rather strong
indication that they contain information not available in contemporaneous
values of the variables in the VAR.
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7. Non-Bayesian hypothesis tests at a conventional significance level, like the likeli-
hood ratio test in this paragraph, are not reliable guides to choice between smaller and
larger models, if only because they will not settle firmly on the smaller model when it is
correct, no matter how large the sample. The Schwarz criterion is widely used instead of,
or as a supplement to, likelihood ratio tests, because it does converge to the smaller model
when the smaller model is correct. A posterior odds ratio uses the prior probability over the
parameters, together with the model’s probability over the data, conditional on the param-
eters, to form an overall probability distribution for the data. It then compares models by
looking at how likely the observed data are from the perspective of each model’s probabil-
ity distribution for the data. The Schwarz criterion is derived as an asymptotic approxima-
tion to the log posterior odds ratio. A posterior odds ratio, like the Schwarz criterion, takes
systematic account of the number of parameters in a model, and hence avoids being misled
by overfitting.
Table 10. Estimates of Vector Autoregressions Including One-Quarter-Ahead Green
Book Inﬂation Forecasts as an Explanatory Variable
a
Coefﬁcient on  
Green Book Standard
Dependent variableb forecast error t statistic
GNP or GDP –0.2558 0.1585 –1.61
GNP or GDP deﬂator 0.1852 0.0735 2.52
Federal funds rate 0.7145 0.2279 3.13
Commodity price index  –0.5663 2.2832 –0.25




Probability (p) that Green Book  0.72
forecast improves ﬁt
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. The VAR used four lags on each of its ﬁve dependent variables and included the previous period’s one-quarter-ahead Green
Book forecast. The restricted and the unrestricted VARs were estimated using a combination of a “Minnesota prior” symmetric
across own and other variables with “unit root” and “cointegration” dummy observations. Parameters were λ = 5, µ = 2, ξ = 3,
θ = 1.5. See appendix A for details. Green book forecasts were for the GNP deﬂator until December 1991, and for the GDP deﬂa-
tor thereafter.
b. Sample period is 1975:3 to 1997:1.
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with the forecast errors themselves having no inﬂuence on the economy,
including actual future inﬂation on the right-hand side of the VAR should
make the Green Book forecasts insigniﬁcant in all equations. As can be
seen from table 11, however, the evidence on this is mixed. The individ-
ual coefﬁcients on the Green Book forecasts in the equations (except the
price equation itself) are all less than 2, and when considered jointly they
are just barely signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Posterior odds favor the model
without Green Book forecasts by about 4 to 1, which is not decisive.
If the Green Book forecasts were better solely because they reﬂected
greater knowledge of Federal Reserve policy intentions and mispercep-
tions, one might expect that once the actual future federal funds rate is
allowed on the right-hand side of the VAR regressions, the contribution
of the Green Book forecast to the ﬁt should disappear. The evidence here
is quite similar to what emerges when current inﬂation is included in the
system (table 12). The individual t statistics on the Green Book forecasts
are all less than 1, the joint χ2 statistic is at the margin of signiﬁcance (this
time just below the 0.05 level rather than just above), and the posterior
odds favor the model that excludes the Green Book forecasts, this time by
about 10 to 1, which is approaching the decisive range.
Note that in table 10 the coefﬁcient on the Green Book forecast in the
federal funds rate equation is strongly positive, indeed insigniﬁcantly
different from 1. This means that even when several lagged values of
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Table 11. Estimates of Vector Autoregressions Including One-Quarter-Ahead Green
Book Inﬂation Forecasts and Current Inﬂation as Explanatory Variablesa
Coefﬁcient on  
Green Book Standard
Dependent variable forecast error t statistic
GNP or GDP –0.3609 0.2148 –1.68
Federal funds rate 0.5600 0.3089 1.81
Commodity price index –3.3499 3.0942 –1.08




Probability (p) that Green Book  0.2024
forecast improves ﬁt 
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. See table 10 for a description of the regressions.
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next period’s inﬂation is a strong predictor of next period’s federal funds
rate. This is consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve responds to
its own forecasts of inﬂation and that its forecasts therefore contribute to
the ﬁt through their contribution to forecasting interest rates.
Despite the caveats about data availability, the pattern of these results
is consistent with the view that the forecasting superiority of the Federal
Reserve arises from its having an advantage in the timing of informa-
tion—even with the view that this might arise entirely from the Federal
Reserve having advance knowledge of its own policy intentions. The sta-
tistical results do not prove that this view is correct, but they support it as
an interesting hypothesis.
The Role of Subjective Forecasting
The persistence of the system of aggregating the views of sectoral
experts to generate forecasts, despite decades of work on formal quantita-
tive models, suggests that the expert system makes a contribution that is
not easily duplicated with a formal model. What is this contribution? 
One hypothesis is that the models are ﬂawed descriptions of the econ-
omy (which is certainly true) and that the expert judgment of seasoned
economists allows more subtle and accurate understandings of the econ-
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Table 12. Estimates of Vector Autoregressions Including One-Quarter-Ahead Green
Book Inﬂation Forecasts and the Federal Funds Rate as Explanatory Variablesa
Coefﬁcient on  
Green Book Standard
Dependent variable forecast error t statistic
GNP or GDP –0.3011 0.1710 –1.76
GNP or GDP deﬂator 0.3026 0.2258 1.34
Commodity price index –0.4614 2.4671 –0.19




Probability (p) that Green Book  0.0720
forecast improves ﬁt
Source: Author’s regressions.
a. See table 10 for a description of the regressions.
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four central banks expressed this view. Instead they claimed that the sub-
jective forecasters mainly provide a more accurate picture of the current
state of the economy than a single quantitative model can easily provide.
This view was stated most clearly and strongly by those actually involved
in making subjective forecasts. They argued that they pay attention to a
large amount of data from disparate sources, some of it nonquantitative.
They also (this view was stated most clearly at the Federal Reserve) have
an understanding of how disaggregated bits of data feed into the prepara-
tion of the aggregate numbers that are put forward with some delay by the
statistical agencies. This gives the experts a starting point for their fore-
casts that is more accurate than can be obtained from a model that is based
on data generated at ﬁxed monthly or quarterly intervals and uses a slowly
changing list of strictly quantitative variables. Because most economic
variables are highly persistent, this advantage in the initial period of the
forecast translates into a persistent advantage. However, several of those
involved in subjective forecasting, at more than one central bank,
expressed the view that the advantage of subjective forecasts is almost
entirely in getting the current and the next quarter right. Extrapolations
beyond this horizon, they felt, could be done more reliably with the large
model.
The historical record of Federal Reserve forecasts, examined in the
previous section, is consistent with this view. It was shown that Green
Book forecasts made at date t for quarter t + 1 make a strong contribution
to a VAR model’s ﬁt if they are introduced on the right-hand side of a
VAR regression, with forecasts made at quarter t competing for explana-
tory power with other variables dated t. But the Green Book forecasts’
contribution to ﬁt became much weaker when either the next quarter’s
inﬂation or the next quarter’s interest rate was introduced as a right-hand-
side variable. Also, the fact that the MPS model forecasts are very close in
accuracy to the Green Book forecasts, together with the strong feedback
between model forecasts and subjective forecasts in the policy process (as
previously discussed), is consistent with the view that large-model fore-
casts can be as good as subjective forecasts if given equally good assess-
ments of initial conditions.
If this view is correct, it helps explain why both large-scale modeling
and subjective, or expert-based, forecasting persist in all these central
banks. For the foreseeable future, explicit quantitative models are going
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variables actually in use changes over time. In some cases recognition of
a policy problem or of newly apparent gaps in existing data can lead to
new data collection efforts. This is accounting innovation, and it is hard
to see how it can fail to include a substantial subjective or expert-based
component.
Unusual events—an oil crisis, an attack on the currency, a September
11, a data collection error—can create large disturbances in data series
that are not best treated as simple draws from a historical distribution of
random disturbances. Because such disturbances are large and have an
apparent explanation, one can likely predict that their effects will have a
different pattern of persistence or influence on other variables than a typ-
ical random draw of a disturbance. Analysis of such historically unusual
disturbances—including the determination of whether they really 
are historically unusual—will inevitably involve an element of subjec-
tive judgment. That is, because they are unique or unusual, extrapolating
their effects must rely on more than historical statistical patterns of
variation.
A Brief and Selective History of Statistical Modeling 
for Macroeconomic Policy
Jan Tinbergen’s early classic macroeconometric models collected
equations estimated by single-equation methods.8 Trygve Haavelmo
pointed out that the resulting models implied a joint distribution for the
data and that the models should therefore be estimated and assessed as
multivariate models.9 This insight led to further developments in statisti-
cal theory, computational methods, and applied macroeconomic model-
ing. This simultaneous-equations or “Cowles Foundation” approach to
modeling perhaps reached its peak in the collaboration to develop the
MPS model, in which many leading academics worked to create a large-
scale model usable for forecasting and policy analysis.
As noted above in the discussion of the policy process, each of the four
central banks examined here has a primary model. These models have
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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each central bank clearly keeps track of the others’ work, so that there are
important similarities in the models’ current forms.
The MPS model became the main econometric model in use at the Fed-
eral Reserve. It remained so for over ﬁfteen years, slowly evolving over
time. It was retired at the end of 1995 and replaced by the model known as
FRB/US, developed by Federal Reserve staff. The Bank of Canada,
meanwhile, used a sequence of models, called RDX1, RDX2, and RDXF,
ﬁnally scrapping them for a quite different model, the QPM. That model
is essentially the same as that used at the Riksbank, and it has inﬂuenced
the modeling efforts of other inﬂation-targeting central banks around the
world.
Econometrics and macroeconomics were active research areas during
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and one might therefore have hoped that
there would be clear progress moving from the early simultaneous-
equations models to the MPS and the RDX models and finally to the
current QPM and FRB/US models. But if there has been progress, it cer-
tainly has not been clear, and my own view is that, by and large, the
changes in these models over time have been more regress than progress.
This is not entirely the fault of the central bank researchers who have
controlled the models’ evolution. The model builders have tried to take
account of what they perceived as modern developments in macro-
economics and data analysis. But academic research in these areas has
paid very little attention to the central problems of modeling for macro-
economic policy in real time. The three main academic research themes to
which the modelers have tried to respond are rational expectations (or,
more broadly, dynamic stochastic equilibrium modeling), calibration, and
unit-root econometrics. The research that has emerged in these areas
applies only very awkwardly to policy modeling problems. The attempts
of central bank modelers to apply this research to their problems have
therefore tended to make matters worse, not better. Another research
theme, VAR modeling, was obtaining results that should on the face of it
have been more directly applicable to real-time policy modeling. How-
ever, even here there were important mismatches between what was going
on in the academic literature and the needs of the policy modelers.
The following subsections describe the most serious problems faced by
the modelers, with some discussion of the absence of guidance on them
from academic research. 
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The four central banks studied here use models with ﬁfteen to forty
behavioral equations, with several lags of each variable typically appear-
ing in the model. The classic simultaneous-equations toolkit was entirely
based on asymptotic distribution theory, assuming that sample size is very
large relative to the number of parameters being estimated and the num-
ber of variables being considered. But in these models those conditions do
not hold. Two-stage least squares (2SLS), the most widely used and eas-
ily implemented estimator suggested by simultaneous-equations theory,
degenerates to ordinary least squares (OLS) when the number of instru-
ments reaches the sample size, and in practice it gets close to OLS well
before that. Econometric theory gave no guidance as to how to truncate
the instrument list, or even as to whether it was a good idea to do so.
Limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) and full-information
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimators had the reputation of being difﬁ-
cult to implement and unreliable, and of course they also have only
asymptotic justiﬁcation. If taking account of simultaneity implied using
one of these estimation methods, it seemed to require a lot of work to end
up with results that were arbitrary (if based on a truncated instrument list),
almost the same as OLS (2SLS with all available instruments), or quirky
(FIML and LIML).
The Need for Decentralization
Good real-time forecasting and policy analysis require processing very
large amounts of data. Maintaining a good forecasting model of a scale
relevant to policy is more than a one-person task. The response to this sit-
uation in central banks has been, as already discussed, to allocate respon-
sibility for “sectors” (largely identiﬁed with particular variables in a
model) to experts or groups of experts, each responsible for keeping up to
date with the ﬂow of current data in their area. The MPS model was gen-
erated in a decentralized process, in which sectors of the model were
assigned to individual economists or groups of economists. The Bank of
Canada’s RDXF model differed from RDX1 and RDX2 in pushing this
decentralization perhaps to its limit: each of the sectoral experts main-
tained separate equations of the overall model, with little attention to the
24 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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that was worse than its predecessors in terms of its long-term simulation
properties. A similar history has occurred at the Federal Reserve, in the
development of its Global model. This model ties together the FRB/US
model with models for thirty other countries. The list of countries has
grown over time, with the need to take account of ﬁnancial developments
in various parts of the world. But, as a result, the model can no longer be
solved in its “forward-looking” mode (that is, with model-consistent
expectations). This is not a matter mainly of computational time; it
reﬂects the nonexistence of a well-deﬁned solution to the full system.
This is the direction in which the VAR literature veered furthest from
policy modeling reality. The VAR literature began by questioning
whether the dissection of models into distinct, manageable equations
with small numbers of variables could be justified; it urged treating
equations more symmetrically, focusing on properties of the whole sys-
tem of equations rather than on individual equations. The VAR literature
may have been right about this in principle, but even if the point is
accepted, it still provides no answer as to how to proceed to model thirty
or forty variables jointly in real time with the human resources available
in a central bank research department. Nor does it directly answer the
question of how to integrate the subjective input of experts, who are fol-
lowing more detailed data than are in the model, with the model’s own
results. The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis did for a number of
years maintain a VAR model on a policy-relevant scale, and this model
did include a sectoral decomposition. However, the model had a nine-
variable behavioral core that took no feedback from the sectoral detail,
which instead worked off of the core recursively. The model could gen-
erate forecasts and policy projections with useful detail, but its structure
implied that there was no role for sectoral expertise in improving the
forecasts of the main aggregates.
Simultaneous-equations econometrics and rational expectations theory
were equally unhelpful on this score, of course. The theory of simultane-
ous equations implies no meaningful distinction between “left-hand-side”
and “right-hand-side” variables. Thus the practice of naming equations
after variables and assigning a sectoral expert to each runs counter to the
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tions limiting the list of variables in a behavioral equation were especially
dubious, because of the way expectations make every part of the model
relevant to behavior in other parts.
Integration of Stochastic Modeling with 
Decisionmaking Uncertainty
Textbook econometrics has remained almost entirely non-Bayesian,
meaning that it maintains a sharp distinction between “unknown” but
nonrandom “parameters,” on the one hand, and random “disturbances” on
the other. Only the estimators, not the parameters themselves, are random.
But in decisionmaking under uncertainty, simple axiomatics, as well as
the intuition of most decisionmakers, leads to thinking of everything
unknown as subject to probability calculations, including parameter val-
ues and even which of a list of models is correct. Their conventional
econometrics training leads central bank staff economists to think of this
kind of practical odds calculation as unscientiﬁc, or as not econometric.
Here are two examples.
In my discussions with Federal Reserve staff, two economists, on sep-
arate occasions, brought up the example of how the Federal Reserve wres-
tled during the 1990s with the question of whether the rate of productivity
growth had undergone a permanent shift. They pointed out that evidence
on this accumulated slowly and that even now the conclusion remained
uncertain. They suggested that if they had proceeded “scientiﬁcally” (the
actual word used by one of them), they would have tested the null hypoth-
esis of no change in the productivity growth rate and treated it as true until
it was rejected at a 5 percent signiﬁcance level. But as a practical matter,
they pointed out, policymakers were not interested in that sort of analysis.
Policymakers wanted to know what the weight of the evidence was—
what were the current probabilities—not whether a test of the null was
passed. Furthermore, policymakers were weighing the probability of a
change in the growth rate against the costs of erring in either direction—
either assuming no change when there had in fact been a change, or
assuming a change when in fact there had been none. That these elemen-
tary applications of the ideas of Bayesian decision theory were seen as
unscientiﬁc and as in conﬂict with the use of econometrics is a sad com-
mentary on the way econometrics is now being taught.
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ing the origins of the QPM:
. . . at policy institutions, the balancing of type I versus type II errors of econo-
metric inference matters less than the balancing of type I versus type II errors in
policy advice. Thus, it may be better for a policy model to assume that a partic-
ular economic structure exists, even when the evidence is not overwhelming, if
the costs of incorrectly assuming otherwise would be relatively high.11
This passage occurs as part of a justiﬁcation for considering criteria for
model ﬁt that are not “econometric.”
Inﬂation-targeting central banks have generally (and this applies to
both the Riksbank and the Bank of England) published their inﬂation
forecasts in the form of fan charts: time-series plots that show not a single
line but a fan of differently shaded regions, with darker regions meant to
be considered more probable than lighter ones. Policy boards are con-
cerned to make it clear, when they publish inﬂation forecasts, that they do
not have a ﬁrmly held single number in mind, but instead a distribution of
possible outcomes. This makes it clear that the policy board has not made
a mistake, or failed to deliver on a commitment, when outcomes deviate
from their most likely values by about the expected absolute amount.
When I realized this, my initial thought was that this must imply an
increased role for stochastic economic models, which would be used to
generate the distributions needed for these charts. But at the Riksbank and
the Bank of England, econometric models are not used at all in preparing
these charts. 
There are two reasons for this. One is that these charts represent policy
choices and commitments by the policy board. Their subjective judgment
is an essential element in preparing the charts. Non-Bayesian approaches
to econometrics have no conceptual framework for combining stochastic
simulation of an econometric model with subjective judgment. Perhaps
more important, everyone understands that the main source of uncertainty
about forecasts generated by a model is not the disturbance terms in the
model, but rather errors of estimation in the coefﬁcients and uncertainty
about whether this model, as opposed to a number of others from which
forecasts are available, is closer to the truth. Combining subjective judg-
ment, uncertainty about parameter values, and uncertainty across models
with uncertainty about equation disturbance terms would be a technically
Christopher A. Sims 27
11. Black and others (1994, p. 65).
1017-01 BPEA/Sims  12/30/02  14:48  Page 27demanding task in any case. But Bayesian thinking provides a clear con-
ceptual starting point, whereas the classical apparatus of conﬁdence inter-
vals, tests, and distributions of estimators (as opposed to parameters)
provides no useful conceptual framework for these issues. The central
bank staff who work on these fan charts understand very well the impor-
tance of judgmental input and that they are working with a version of sub-
jective probability as they prepare the charts. But they have not seen a
practical way to make econometric models useful as they do it.12
A senior staff member of the Bank of England described an incident in
which he was asked by a reporter, who had just viewed a fan chart for out-
put growth, what was the probability of two successive quarters of nega-
tive output growth over the span of the forecast. The economist had no
answer, because the simple process of extracting judgmental probability
distributions that generates the charts applies only to the terminal values
the charts display. The evolution of the probability bands over time that
the charts display is generated entirely by interpolation. This is the kind of
useful extension of the existing analysis that could be produced if models
and methods that can handle all the sources of uncertainty and merge it
with subjective judgment were available.
Modeling Policy Choice
Some difﬁcult conceptual issues surround the use of a statistical model
ﬁt to historical data to project the effects of a disturbance of known type,
including when the disturbance is a change in policy. These issues were
confronted and analyzed clearly early in the literature on simultaneous
equations, perhaps best by Leonid Hurwicz.13 He explained why it is by
deﬁnition essential to have a structural model in order to analyze inter-
ventions. The early simultaneous-equations modelers understood this
point in principle, although the fact that it applied strongly to macroeco-
nomic policy interventions was not widely recognized early on in econo-
metric practice. The most common procedure was to assume that the
policy variables in the estimation were exogenous, and then to model pol-
icy changes as changes in the time path of the policy variables. More
recently, thanks mainly to the structural VAR literature, it has been rec-
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variables (such as the interest rate or the money stock) is a nontrivial
problem. It has become common for models to include an equation char-
acterizing monetary policy behavior as setting the short-term interest rate
in response to the state of the economy. Policy changes are modeled as
temporary or permanent changes in this reaction function, including, as a
special case, setting time paths for the interest rate or (equivalently) for
disturbances to the policy reaction function.
This is all straightforward, and practical policy modeling has never
shown much confusion about it. However, many economists interpreted
the rational expectations critique of econometric policy evaluation as
implying that this way of modeling policy choices had deep conceptual
ﬂaws.14 The idea is that setting time paths of policy equation disturbances
does not change the unconditional joint distribution of the time series
implied by the model, and that because (unconditional) expected welfare is
determined by this joint distribution, nothing important is affected by such
choices of random disturbances. Many economists, even on central bank
staffs, claim to hold this view even today.15 Actual policy projections are
still done, however, and in the same way as before, for the most part. Pol-
icy simulations using the QPM and FRB/US can be carried out with
model-consistent expectations, and considerable effort went into making
these models capable of distinguishing such projections from the usual
kind. However, such projections, for policies that are not actually perma-
nent changes, do not respond to Sargent’s objections. Furthermore, it has
turned out, as discussed below, that projections with model-consistent
expectations are not the type most commonly used in practice.
Rigor versus Fit 
Most economists would agree that a policy model should ideally be
derived from a theory of the behavior of economic agents who interact to
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generally nonlinear and difﬁcult to solve. Those that are soluble with rea-
sonable time and effort tend to be fairly small and to be built around a
small number of sources of stochastic disturbance. For these reasons they
tend not to ﬁt the data nearly as well as more loosely restricted models,
such as VARs. This situation has been a source of major concern at cen-
tral banks for some years, and they have research under way to try to
overcome the problems. Academic researchers, in contrast, have paid lit-
tle attention to these issues. Those engaged in building dynamic stochas-
tic general-equilibrium models (DSGEs) have tended to stick to small
models, with little apparent interest in expanding to the scale needed by
central banks. This probably reﬂects the view held by many of those most
active in working with DSGEs that real-time monetary policy formation
is not very important to economic welfare. Those involved in building
structural VAR models have written papers aimed at academic audiences,
engaging in disputes about the effects of monetary policy and deliberately
leaving unspeciﬁed the detailed interpretation of the private sector com-
ponents of their models.
Despite concern about this issue at the central banks, little progress has
been made. The International Finance Section of the Federal Reserve’s
research department has a project under way to construct a DSGE model
that might serve as a partial substitute for their Global model, which, as
already noted, has become unwieldy. Those in charge of the project are
not at all sure, however, how much of the Global model’s function the
new model can take over. The Bank of England is in the midst of a two-
year project to construct a new primary model. After considerable thought
and investigation, researchers there have concluded that they will not be
able to construct a DSGE model that ﬁts the data well enough to be used
for forecasting. They plan to construct such a model nonetheless, and to
append to it ad hoc stochastic elements that can bring it into contact with
the data. This perceived tension between rigor and ﬁt is discussed explic-
itly in the Bank of Canada’s documentation for the QPM.16
Both at the Bank of Canada and at the Federal Reserve, the existing
primary models were seen at the beginning of the 1990s as inadequate. At
the Bank of Canada this reflected the results of radical decentralization
and a focus on single-equation fit, which had produced what was seen as
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times misbehave when used for longer-term projections. I am not sure
whether these considerations were as important at the Federal Reserve.
However, at both central banks there was a desire to make the model
more modern by introducing forward-looking elements, so that a distinc-
tion between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes was formally
possible.
The new models, the QPM and FRB/US, have a tiered structure. In the
ﬁrst tier, long-run, static relationships among variables are postulated. In
the QPM this tier is based on an overlapping-generations growth model
whose parameters are set by calibration. In practice this means simply
that no measures of uncertainty are attached to parameter estimates. The
parameter estimates emerge from a mixture of subjective prior informa-
tion and informal matching of model properties to some summary statis-
tics generated from the data. In FRB/US the static relationships are in
many cases generated from static regression equations. These are labeled
“cointegrating equations,” which allows invocation of asymptotic theory
that implies that uncertainty in their coefﬁcients is negligible, and thereby
also justiﬁes estimating them by straightforward methods, independent of
the second tier’s complicated dynamics.
The second tier of the models describes adjustment to the long-run
equilibrium. In almost every behavioral equation there is a single desig-
nated left-hand-side variable, and a “target” for it is generated from the
ﬁrst-tier static relations. An equation is then estimated describing the
dynamics of adjustment of the left-hand-side variable to its target value.
This breaking of the model into static and dynamic tiers is common to
all four of the models considered here in detail. It can be seen as a reaction
to the tendency of models built up from decentralized sectors to display
inconvenient long-run simulation properties. However, whether via cali-
bration ideology or via cointegration asymptotic theory, it also insulates
the long-run properties of the model from any serious interaction with the
data.
The QPM and FRB/US models introduce widespread expectational
dynamics through a standard mechanism. The left-hand-side variable is
assumed to be determined as the outcome of an optimization problem in
which the variable tracks its target value, subject to adjustment costs that
depend on squared differences in the variable of some order up to k. Such
an optimization problem implies that the current value of the variable will
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symmetry restrictions connecting the pattern of coefﬁcients on future and
on past values.
This approach to equation speciﬁcation does introduce expectational
terms pervasively in the model, but it does not respond convincingly to
the critiques of the older simultaneous-equations models from the rational
expectations and real business cycle perspectives. Those critiques empha-
sized the interdependence of model speciﬁcation across equations and the
derivation of dynamics and steady states from the same internally consis-
tent, multiple-equation, equilibrium model. That research program does
not lead to models that are collections of single-equation, adjustment-to-
target speciﬁcations. A clear exposition of how this approach works in the
investment sector of FRB/US is presented by Michael Kiley.17 The part of
the model for this sector explains, with separate equations, demand for
four kinds of investment goods: high-technology equipment, other equip-
ment, inventories, and nonresidential structures. The possibility that these
four highly interrelated variables might have dynamics that interact was
apparently not considered. Equation estimates are presented separately,
with no check on whether the implied restrictions on the cross-variable
dynamics are consistent with the data.
In the QPM the dynamic equations in the second tier are calibrated,
just as are the steady-state equations. The model is therefore probably
unreliable for forecasting. FRB/US, on the other hand, is ﬁt, largely by
OLS, equation by equation. OLS estimation is possible because the
expected future values in the dynamic equations are replaced by forecasts
from a reduced-form VAR. In principle it is possible that simultaneity
would make the resulting collection of single equations perform badly as
a system. However, the use of ﬂexible lag structures and the modest
amount of simultaneity in the system apparently make it a reasonable
approximation to a VAR. The process of model building included com-
parison of the model’s impulse responses with those of a reduced-form
VAR, with adjustments undertaken if the deviations were too sharp.
The Bank of England’s MM and the ECB’s AWM contain much more
limited forward-looking components. Their dynamic equations do not
have the constrained symmetry of FRB/US and QPM, so that the appear-
ance of lags in an MM or AWM equation does not force the appearance of
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only in the form of expected inﬂation, which enters mainly the wage-price
block of equations and is proxied in estimation by a weighted average of
inﬂation in the two previous quarters.
Assessment of the Primary Models
Having given up on the statistical theory based on simultaneous equa-
tions, which seemed to be providing no guidance to models of the scale
actually in use, central bank modelers have ended up back at the level of
the original Tinbergen model or worse. The models they use have no
claim to be probability models of the joint behavior of the data series they
are meant to explain, and they are not being checked against competitors
by well-deﬁned criteria of ﬁt. It is unlikely that any systematic improve-
ment in the models is possible without changing this situation.
The central banks using these models have given up on any serious
effort to fit the data, in large measure as a trade-off for an apparently
more rigorous theoretical foundation. But the improvement in rigor is
largely illusory. The single-equation “target-tracking” specifications in
FRB/US and the QPM do not accord with modern DSGE theory, and they
seem unlikely to give anything close to an accurate rendition of the con-
trast between anticipated and unanticipated policy changes. Indeed, the
FRB/US model is seldom used in its “model-consistent expectations”
mode. Most uses of the model are for monetary policy, with a horizon of
up to two years or so. In this time frame it is not reasonable to suppose
that the public would quickly perceive and act on a shift in policy behav-
ior. The VAR forecasts are therefore likely to be more reasonable
approximations to actual expectations. But further, even when accurate
anticipation is more plausible, the model in rational expectations mode is
said generally to imply unrealistically strong and quick responses to pol-
icy actions.
I used to argue that the big policy models, although not structural in the
sense they claimed to be, were still useful summaries of statistical regu-
larities, as they were not far from being simply big VARs with quite a few
exclusion restrictions. The QPM, however, cannot be rationalized in this
way, because it is entirely calibrated. FRB/US may still be a good data
summary, although its tiered structure makes it difﬁcult to assess this.
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was a six-month hiatus in the preparation of model forecasts during the
1996 transition to FRB/US from the MPS, it will not be possible to assess
FRB/US’s performance for a few more years, absent a change in the Fed-
eral Reserve’s disclosure policy.
Directions for Improvement
Bayesian statistical inference is sometimes mistakenly thought of as a
collection of “techniques” for doing the same sorts of things that can be
done by other “techniques.” But this is a mistake. Bayesian inference is a
perspective, a way of thinking about statistical techniques, not a collec-
tion of techniques in itself. The Bayesian perspective on inference, if it
were widely understood by those working on policy models, would ease
the connection between modeling and decisionmaking. The non-Bayesian
(sometimes imprecisely called “classical”) perspective, which is more
appropriate (if anywhere) in the natural sciences, imposes on itself the
rule that only potentially observable data, not parameters or competing
models, have probabilities attached to them. It is not possible, within the
non-Bayesian perspective, to make a statement like the following: “Given
the data observed so far, the probability that β lies between 1.2 and 2.7 is
0.95,” or “Given the data observed so far, and taking account of our
uncertainty about model parameters, the probability that next quarter’s
GDP growth rate will be between 1.1 percent and 2.1 percent is 0.95,” or
“Given the data observed so far, the probabilities of each of the three
models being the correct one are 0.2, 0.1, and 0.7, respectively.” Econo-
mists who have been well trained in the non-Bayesian perspective know
this and often claim not to be bothered by it. But when a decisionmaker,
confronted with results from three models that conﬂict, asks what the data
imply about uncertainties across the models, he or she does not want to be
told that no probability weights can be given for the models. Weighting
uncertain prospects to compare the expected consequences of different
courses of action is the essence of decisionmaking.
Because the need for such probabilities, conditional on observed data,
is so clear, non-Bayesian statistics does attempt to produce substitutes for
them. Conﬁdence intervals, which are not probability intervals condi-
tional on data, are often interpreted as if they were. There is a classical lit-
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and has produced a bewildering variety of procedures. There are ways,
from a non-Bayesian perspective, to create hybrids of conﬁdence inter-
vals and probability intervals that in some sense incorporate parameter
uncertainty into measures of forecast uncertainty, but this is not the same
thing as probability intervals conditioned on the data.
Since these substitutes are often in practice interpreted as if they were
probability statements conditioned on the data, the distinction between
the Bayesian and the non-Bayesian perspective is sometimes seen as
philosophical hairsplitting. But there are some real costs to the persistence
of non-Bayesian thinking among econometricians. There is an important
difference, for example, between the situation where the data do not dis-
criminate sharply among several competing models but one ﬁts slightly
better, and the situation where a single model stands out as best ﬁtting.
Econometric analysis should be able to give quantitative guidance as to
which type of situation one is in, rather than insisting on the impropriety
of putting probabilities on models. Inference about unit roots and cointe-
gration is, from a non-Bayesian perspective, extremely complex—so
complex that the academic literature provides little practical guidance
about how to handle such phenomena in models of the scale of central
bank primary models. The literature has also emphasized asymptotic
results that in many cases appear to justify multistage inference, “testing”
for unit roots and estimating cointegrating relationships, and then treating
the results of this ﬁrst stage of inference as if they were free of uncer-
tainty. But in actual, ﬁnite samples the uncertainty surrounding these ﬁrst-
stage inferences is often high. Ignoring it produces unbelievable results.
Despite not applying unit-root theory at the full system level, because of
its impracticality, several of the central bank models do apply it in exactly
this multistage way, equation by equation. A Bayesian perspective would
allow setting aside the multistage complexity of this inference and
thereby would allow a more accurate and believable characterization of
uncertainty about low-frequency aspects of the model. Analysis of the
possibility that a model’s parameters have shifted at discrete points in
time is another situation, central to the use of models in decisionmaking,
that is much more straightforward to analyze from a Bayesian than from a
non-Bayesian perspective.
The Bayesian perspective recognizes that all decisionmaking depends
on a decisionmaker’s judgment as well as on inference from the data, and
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Bayesian perspective, which avoids the subject. When the role of judg-
ment is kept under the table, it becomes more difﬁcult to discuss it and
more difﬁcult to recognize bad judgment.
But the most persuasive argument for the Bayesian perspective is its
increasing ability to make apparently intractable inference problems
tractable. Within the last ﬁve years or so, economists have become aware
of Markov-Chain Monte Carlo methods for Bayesian analysis of econo-
metric models. These methods are being applied rather widely, particu-
larly in ﬁnance, and as economists begin to see them produce insights into
otherwise intractable problems, they are likely to learn how to use these
methods and understand their rationale. In fact, a recent paper by
Frank Smets and Raf Wouter apparently represents the first example of a
DSGE that has been fit to data and produces a fit that is competitive with
that of a Bayesian reduced-form VAR.18 The paper accomplishes this in a
Bayesian framework, using Markov-Chain Monte Carlo methods, and
thereby produces a model that should be directly usable for realistic sto-
chastic simulation and should be directly comparable in fit to models
with different specifications. Although it explains just nine variables, it
was put together by two researchers in a relatively short time. With the
resources of a central bank research staff and computational equipment,
the same methods should work on models of the scale of today’s central
bank primary models. On the face of it, this makes obsolete the wide-
spread belief that rigorous dynamic theoretical modeling and good statis-
tical fit are incompatible.
So the problem of conﬂict between rigor and ﬁt in modeling may be on
its way to resolution. Since it appears that this resolution will involve an
increased awareness of Bayesian ideas, there may be progress along the
way in formalizing the connection between subjective judgment and
model forecasts. But the problem of decentralizing modeling effort seems
likely to remain difﬁcult for some time.
A model like that of Smets and Wouter contains both ﬁrm and house-
hold sectors, but each of these sectors generates several tightly related
behavioral equations. It does not seem much more suited than a VAR to
equation-by-equation decentralization. Given the nature of central bank
subjective forecasting, however, it might be possible to combine variable-
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approach to modeling. It might be worth exploring a structure in which
judgmental forecasters focus almost entirely on the current and the next
quarter. Their forecasts could be treated as noisy observations on the data
that enter a Bayesian structural model. Model forecasts could then incor-
porate these observations, as well as generate measures of how implausi-
ble they are.
Conclusion
As I see it, the most important component of inﬂation targeting is the
regular reporting of the forecasts and policy analyses by the central bank
that the targeting regime entails.19 This supports central bank policy by
making it easier to preserve credibility in the face of shocks that create
temporary increases in the inﬂation rate. By announcing a policy path and
a corresponding inﬂation path, the central bank may be able to convince
people that the inﬂation will end without having to generate a recession.
This regular reporting of forecasts also encourages probabilistic thinking
and creates a demand, as yet unsatisﬁed, for policy models that can gener-
ate realistic measures of uncertainty about their results.
Some apparently unnecessary barriers to transparency in monetary pol-
icy persist. Other central banks around the world are regularly reporting
inﬂation and output forecasts without ill consequences, indeed with
apparently good consequences. The Federal Reserve’s Green Book fore-
casts of inﬂation are of very high quality. They could be useful to the pri-
vate sector and, if published in a timely way, could contribute to the
effectiveness of Federal Reserve policy actions. It seems that, at least for
these forecasts, the ﬁve-year embargo should be dropped.
In the inﬂation-targeting countries, the internal consistency of fore-
casts would be improved and the level of discussion of policy elevated by
switching to a practice of publishing forecasts in which inﬂation, output,
and interest rates all appear and have been derived from a model so as to
be mutually consistent. The usual objection is that this asks too much of
policy boards that already have difﬁculty agreeing on just the current
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ing several proposed time paths for the policy rate does not seem much
more difﬁcult than the problem of generating a skewed fan chart distribu-
tion, which policy boards are already solving. Here again is an area where
considerable progress could be had cheaply.
Finally, there are the central challenges of policy modeling. Is it realis-
tic to hope that fully identiﬁed models can be found that allow storytelling
not only about the effects of policy but also about where major shocks
have originated, and that ﬁt the data? Is it realistic to expect that econo-
mists can learn to understand the Bayesian perspective on inference and
how it dovetails with decision theory? Is it practical to continue to do pol-
icy modeling in teams, while also improving the models along these
lines? I have argued that the answer to the ﬁrst two questions is yes, with
important developments in these areas likely soon. Whether modeling can
be decentralized does not have as clear an answer, although there is some
reason for hope.
The academic branch of the economics profession has not been con-
tributing much to the progress of policy modeling. Increased attention by
scholars to these interesting problems might resolve fairly quickly many
of the problems with central bank practice I have cited. However, aca-
demic interest in these issues has been low for years, and I am not sure
how this can be changed.
APPENDIX A 
VAR Priors
The estimation of the VAR models in this paper uses priors meant to
aid in interpreting the likelihood shape by concentrating attention on the
most reasonable parts of the parameter space. This is necessary in the ﬁrst
place because time-series models, especially models where the number of
parameters is a relatively large fraction of the sample size, easily produce
spuriously precise results, attributing much of the observed sample
behavior to unusual initial conditions, if no prior is used. This problem is
the Bayesian counterpart of the cumbersome unit-root theory in classical
inference.20
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VAR models here, and there are well-known difﬁculties in deciding how
properly to penalize overparameterized models that have good in-sample
ﬁts. The widely applied Schwarz criterion is one approach, and it has a
Bayesian justiﬁcation as a decision procedure in large samples, but its jus-
tiﬁcation when unit roots are possibly present is problematic. Since there
is a widely used, standardized family of priors for VARs that can easily be
made proper (that is, made to integrate to 1), using this prior directly
rather than the Schwarz asymptotic approximation seems like a good
idea, and I have done so here.
The prior probability density function (PDF) is of the form 
where yd and Xd are dummy right-hand-side and left-hand-side variables, k
is the number of columns in Xd, n is the number of equations, and β is the
vector of parameters from all equations, stacked on each other. I have
omitted some factors that vary with n, but not with the data or with k.
This is just convenient notation for a prior that, conditional on Σ, is
Gaussian for β and with the covariance of the β’s across equations ﬁtting
a Σ⊗Ωform, where Ω=(Xd
′ ∗ Xd)–1. The marginal prior on Σ is propor-
tional to |Σ|–n–1/2. This is not a proper prior. It is the limit of an inverse-
Wishart prior with n degrees of freedom as the scale matrix shrinks
toward zero. A proper prior with a very small scale matrix would give
nearly identical results.
This prior is in conjugate form, so that, combined with the likelihood,
it can be integrated analytically to provide posterior odds on models.
The dummy observations actually used were in three sets: 
—A “cointegration” dummy. This is a single observation in which all
exogenous and all current and lagged endogenous variables in the system
are set equal to their means over the period of the initial conditions. If
given very high weight, this dummy forces the appearance of at least one
unit root affecting all variables, in which case it also enforces zero coefﬁ-
cients on exogenous variables, or else it forces the system toward station-
arity with a steady state equal to the initial condition means. This
observation is weighted by the hyperparameter λ. 
—A set of n “unit root” dummies. These, if weighted very strongly,
force the appearance of n unit roots in the system, one in each variable.
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all set equal to initial condition means, and all other variables, including
the constant term, are set to zero. These observations are weighted by the
hyperparameter µ. 
—A version of the Minnesota prior. These are nq + r dummy observa-
tions, where q is the number of lags in the system. For the jth variable’s
kth lag, the “x” dummy observation is nonzero only for that lag of that
variable and is set equal to σjkθ, where σj is the standard deviation of the
changes in the variable over the period of the initial conditions. There are
also dummy observations corresponding to the other right-hand-side vari-
ables, sized simply at the standard deviation of the “x-variable” itself over
the period of the initial conditions. One can think of these as applying
even to the constant term, but since the constant term has zero variance,
the weight on the corresponding dummy observation is zero. This whole
set of observations is given weight ζ. The yd variable is nonzero only for
the lag q of 1, in which case both the left-hand-side and the right-hand-
side y’s are set to σj. This makes the prior mean emerging from these
dummy observations 1 for the ﬁrst own lag, and zero for all other own
lags and for all other variables on the right-hand side.
The VAR results reported in the tables use λ=5, µ=2, and ξ=3. The
last value is close to maximizing the posterior PDF, conditional on (λ,µ)
= (5,2). The values of λ and µ were set based on experience with similar
models. They cannot be chosen to maximize the posterior PDF without
reintroducing the problem of estimates implying spuriously unusual ini-
tial conditions.21
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Discussion
Steven N. Durlauf: This ambitious paper tackles an extraordinarily difﬁ-
cult question: what is the role of formal statistical models in evaluating
economic policies? In particular, the paper studies the use of such models
by central banks in various capacities. Although the paper addresses a
wide range of issues and provides a fair amount of qualitative description
of how central banks use large-scale models, its main contributions are
twofold. First, it provides an evaluation of the forecasting performance of
the Federal Reserve. Second, it addresses several broad questions con-
cerning the appropriate ways of using statistical models in the policy
process. I will deal with each of these components in turn.
Sims’ evaluation of the forecasting accuracy of the Federal Reserve
provides some useful additions to a long-standing literature, in particular
a recent paper by Christina Romer and David Romer.1 Sims compares
both the judgmental and the model-based forecasts of the Federal Reserve
with two alternatives: naïve forecasts and a consensus forecast from the
private sector. What is new in Sims’ comparison relative to that of Romer
and Romer is the attention to the relative virtues of the judgmental and the
model-based forecasts. The main claims Sims makes are, ﬁrst, that the
Federal Reserve forecasts well, especially when forecasting inﬂation; sec-
ond, that the informational contents of different forecasts are highly cor-
related, so that strong claims of superiority of one forecast over another
should be treated as suspect; and third, that there does not appear to be
strong evidence that the judgmental forecasts of the Federal Reserve are
41
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model-based forecasts. 
Although these points are well taken, the analysis succeeds less well in
giving a clear understanding of the differences between the model-based
forecasts and the forecasts that embody subjective judgments. One limita-
tion is that the procedures used for forecast comparison are not well cho-
sen if one’s objective is to go beyond crude summary measures of relative
forecast accuracy to an understanding of why forecasts differ. Root mean
square error is certainly a sensible single summary statistic for comparing
forecasts, but like all such summaries it is limited. In my view, an addi-
tional useful way of comparing two forecasts is to attempt to identify peri-
ods when the two forecasts diverge relatively sharply and compare their
behavior at those times. I suspect that, during shifts across business cycle
regimes, differences are larger between the Federal Reserve forecasts and
the private sector forecasts than in other periods. Put differently, the fact
that two forecasts are approximately equally accurate in periods when
they are close to each other is not informative about their relative perfor-
mance when they are far apart. Presumably what one is interested in is
whether, when the differences are relatively large, one forecast performs
better than the other. 
Further, it would seem that a deeper evaluation of the forecast differ-
ences should address in greater detail the relationship between forecasts
and their use, especially if one is interested in how subjective judgment
affects forecasts. In a 1997 paper (which, curiously, Sims does not refer-
ence), David Reifschneider, David Stockton, and David Wilcox give three
justiﬁcations for the use of judgmental over model-based forecasts: ﬁrst,
the ability of the former to use “potentially valuable information contained
in monthly and weekly data” not incorporated into the model; second, the
integration of “extramodel information and anecdotal evidence into the
forecast”; and third, the ability to address model uncertainty: “the judg-
mental approach . . . enables the staff to examine a range of econometric
speciﬁcations—both structural and reduced form—in producing the fore-
cast rather than relying on a single speciﬁcation enshrined in the ‘staff
model.’”2 These are all plausible reasons for using judgment, and all
would seem relevant to evaluating the effectiveness and value of subjec-
tive judgment in Federal Reserve forecasting. Although Sims’ paper gives
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is given to these other explanations for why judgmental forecasts deviate
from model-based ones. Now, some of these reasons may not be identiﬁ-
able from available data, but if so, that needs to be made clear. Notice as
well that Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox’s comment on model uncer-
tainty suggests that some of the issues raised later in this paper are part of
the Federal Reserve’s mindset; more on this below.
Besides evaluating the accuracy of different forecasts, Sims also makes
a number of broad arguments concerning the nature of large-scale models
as currently employed by central bankers, notably the Federal Reserve.
Anyone even casually acquainted with Sims’ past work will not be sur-
prised to discover that this paper offers serious criticisms of the statistical
models that central banks have constructed as well as the way they are
used. We are told, for example, that “The large models in use in central
banks today have lost any connection to the simultaneous equations–
based statistical theory once thought of as the intellectual foundation of
monetary policymaking. The models are now ﬁt to data by ad hoc proce-
dures that have no grounding in statistical theory.”
Many of these criticisms are trenchant. And I am in absolute agreement
with Sims on one of his main arguments: that evaluation of policies
should be explicitly decision-theoretic. Too much of empirical policy
analysis in academia makes claims of the form that because something is
(or is not) statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level, a certain policy is
(or is not) justiﬁed. This sort of reasoning is ﬂawed because the evalua-
tion of policies requires the comparison of expected beneﬁts and losses,
and therefore it cannot in general be done without attention to the com-
plete conditional distribution of outcomes given a certain policy as well as
an explicit statement of the loss function by which these outcomes are
assessed.3
Unfortunately, much of the paper’s discussion of general issues of
modeling suffers from overstated and poorly justiﬁed claims. One prob-
lem is that the paper takes a dogmatic position on the virtues of Bayesian
methods, which is asserted over and over without argument. For example,
the paper gives no attention to the possibility of constructing decision-
theoretic approaches to data analysis using non-Bayesian ideas. I am
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by Abraham Wald,4 an approach that has helped motivate recent impor-
tant work by Charles Manski.5 To be fair, these approaches have not been
applied to macroeconomic policy contexts, and so it is unclear what they
can accomplish.6 The point, however, is that one can take a rigorous
decision-theoretic approach without adopting the Bayesian paradigm.
Similarly, Sims’ enthusiasm for Bayesian approaches also leads to a
number of questionable assertions about the modeling of persistence in
time series. We are told that classical unit-root methods for analyzing
time series are “cumbersome,” that they provide “little practical guid-
ance” for large models, and that they rely on asymptotic results that are
inapplicable (producing “unbelievable results”) in ﬁnite samples. None of
these claims is persuasive. If cumbersome means computationally difﬁ-
cult, I see no reason why this applies with less force to the Markov-Chain
Monte Carlo methods necessary for Bayesian inference. The second two
claims misrepresent the state of classical unit-root econometrics. That lit-
erature contains a vast number of analyses that attempt to deal with multi-
variate systems with unknown numbers of unit roots. A seminal paper by
Peter Phillips provides a comprehensive methodology that allows one to
simultaneously determine the cointegrating rank and the lag length of a
system of vector autoregressions; these methods move far beyond the
older ones Sims criticizes.7 This literature has also paid enormous atten-
tion to ﬁnite-sample issues related to estimators. As a whole, then, Sims’
criticisms carry very little weight.
Beyond Bayesian dogmatism, a second and more serious problem for
this paper is its Bayesian utopianism. Simply put, the paper fails to
address the issue of how one engages in Bayesian decision-theoretic
analyses in practice. Sims writes that 
Combining subjective judgment, uncertainty about parameter values, and
uncertainty across models with uncertainty about equation disturbance terms
would be a technically demanding task in any case. But Bayesian thinking pro-
vides a clear conceptual starting point, whereas the classical apparatus of conﬁ-
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5. See, for example, Manski (2000).
6. In fairness to the Bayesian approach, Wald’s version of decision theory, although it
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nature” instead.
7. Phillips (1996).
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provides no useful conceptual framework for these issues.
Perhaps these problems are conceptually straightforward in a Bayesian
context, but they are most certainly not operationally straightforward. 
This is clearest in the context of prior information. To take one exam-
ple, consider the question of subjective information. Using Bayesian lan-
guage, recall that the posterior density of an object θ (such as a parameter
or a future outcome) given information at Ft is always written as
Where does this expression allow for subjective judgment? The answer is
via µ(θ), which is the prior probability density associated with θ. Any
available information may be incorporated here, so that, at this level of
generality, the incorporation of subjective beliefs is, as Sims says, con-
ceptually straightforward. But his claim is also question begging. The
incorporation of subjective judgments in the Bayesian framework presup-
poses that this subjective knowledge can be expressed in terms of the
probability density µ(θ). This is a long-standing concern relative to
Bayesian methods, but not an idle one. David Freedman, one of the
world’s leading mathematical statisticians, and such a ferocious critic of
overclaiming in empirical social science as to make Sims look like an
unrepentant data miner, has written 
For thirty years, I have found Bayesian statistics to be a rich source of mathe-
matical questions. However, I no longer see it as the preferred way to do
applied statistics, because I ﬁnd that uncertainty can rarely be quantiﬁed as
probability. The Reverend Thomas Bayes had his doubts too, which is why he
allowed his essay to be published only after his own death; and the matter has
been debated ever since.8
By no means am I arguing that the problem of translating subjective
judgments into probability statements invalidates the Bayesian approach.
Nor am I criticizing the use of priors in general; many of the standard crit-
icisms are uninteresting because they are made without context. For
example, if an uninformative prior “converts” the ordinary least squares
estimate of a parameter into the mean of the posterior density describing
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information, one can equally well ﬁnd eminent statisticians (Dennis Lind-
ley comes to mind) who will claim that the problem of prior construction
is in no way an insuperable barrier to practical Bayesians. Within the
Bayesian statistics literature the issue of converting subjective beliefs into
probability statements is a long-standing area of research; for example,
this is what the literature on Bayesian elicitation is all about. My argu-
ment, rather, is that there exist serious difﬁculties in operationalizing sub-
jective information. Without an explanation of how one is actually going
to do this, it is unclear that one will do better than the admittedly ad hoc
judgmental approach in the Federal Reserve forecasts. Moving from the
general to the speciﬁc, I would urge the reader to ask how subjective judg-
ments about unusual events can be made operational. Does one really
believe that forecasts concerning the effects of September 11 would be
appreciably different had the Federal Reserve followed Sims and used
formal Bayesian language to describe the way it modiﬁed model forecasts
using subjective judgment?
Related problems of prior formulation exist with respect to the model-
ing of model uncertainty.9 I agree with Sims’ argument that it is important
to account for model uncertainty in evaluating policies. A Bayesian per-
spective on model uncertainty can be thought of as follows. Suppose that
there is a set of possible models, M, each element of which implies a joint
probability relationship between the object of interest θ and Ft. When one
fails to account for model uncertainty, in the sense that a particular model
m ∈ M is assumed to be the “true” model, one in essence calculates
Incorporation of model uncertainty requires that one eliminate the condi-
tioning on the particular model m. This is again conceptually straight-
forward. One simply treats m as a random variable and integrates over it;10
that is, 
() ( | ) ( | , )( | ) , 3 µθ µθ µ FF m m F tt t = ∫
() (| , ) . 2 µθ Fm t
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9. Draper (1995) provides a very lucid discussion.
10. Usually, the model space is assumed to be countable, in which case the integral is
replaced by a sum.
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Once again we run into the issue of how to specify prior information,
in this case µ(m), which embodies the prior probabilities one assigns to
the elements of the model space. Little work has been done on this ques-
tion. To take one example, the main place where substantial work on
model uncertainty is currently being done in statistics concerns uncer-
tainty about which variables to include in a model. For linear regressions,
Adrian Raftery, David Madigan, and Jennifer Hoeting discuss methods of
accounting for uncertainty in a given regression coefﬁcient as induced by
uncertainty as to what other variables to include.11 The solution of model
uncertainty of this type is to calculate equation 4 for every element of a
space of models M, where individual elements are alternative choices of
regressors. If one cares about the coefﬁcient on a given regressor where
there are K potential additional regressors, this means there are 2K differ-
ent models in M. How does one set priors for this case? The standard
approach in the statistics literature is to assume that each model is treated
as having a probability pl(m) (1 – p)K–l(m), where l(m) is the number of
regressors included in model m.12 This prior in essence assumes that each
variable is present in a regression with a prior probability p and that the
presence of a given variable is independent of the presence or absence of
the others. As Willard Brock and I have argued,13 in many contexts this is
clearly unsatisfactory from the perspective of economic theory. Variable
selection possesses many features similar to the “red bus/blue bus” prob-
lem in discrete choice theory; that is, different regressors are economi-
cally linked with one another. Leaving aside economic objections,
nothing is known about the robustness of posterior densities based upon
this prior. So, although no one can object to accounting for model uncer-
tainty in principle, the hard task is doing so in a useful fashion.
The issue of prior information is also complicated in terms of the mod-
eling of persistence. The issue of priors and unit roots has in fact been
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in the context of economic growth by Brock and Durlauf (2001), Fernandez, Ley, and Steel
(2001b), and Doppelhofer, Miller, and Sala-i-Martin (2000).
13. Brock and Durlauf (2001).
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tence under allegedly noninformative priors in fact substantially under-
stated the evidence in favor of unit roots in various macroeconomic data
series.14 A key message of Phillips’s paper is that the interpretation of pri-
ors is very difﬁcult in the context of time series with possible unit roots.
Although in this paper Sims advocates different ways of constructing pri-
ors to deal with unit roots from those criticized by Phillips, the solution
seems ad hoc and certainly has not been vetted in the econometrics litera-
ture. Perhaps his approach makes sense, but one needs to be candid in
admitting that it hardly constitutes received wisdom.
Finally, the paper suffers from the problem that, despite its advocacy
of decision-theoretic methods, the paper itself is ultimately not very
decision-theoretic. The paper’s many criticisms are made outside the
context of actual central bank decisionmaking. However, central bank
models have not been developed with the standards of academic journals
in mind; they have been produced to facilitate policymaking in extremely
complicated contexts and should be judged on that basis. Unfortunately,
many of Sims’ criticisms are closer to debating points than substantive
indictments. 
For example, Sims criticizes the way expectations are handled in the
FRB/US model. The criticism is that the formation of expectations does
not respect the systemwide constraints in the model. But what is the
import of this and related criticisms? Is there any reason to believe that
the use of these single-equation estimates of expectations is a ﬁrst-order
issue in terms of forecasting or in terms of policy evaluation? Sims asserts
this is so, but nothing in the paper supports the claim. I would submit that
without some evidence that the various defects of the large-scale models
raised by Sims have some effect on policy evaluation, at least in terms of
the sorts of results the model produces in policy simulations, the criticism
loses much of its force. 
Similarly, many of Sims’ criticisms of the way central banks use mod-
els seem closer to caricatures than descriptions of actual practice. The
paper places particular emphasis on model users’ lack of attention to
model uncertainty and other defects. This contrasts with the description of
model use in Reifschneider, Stockton, and Wilcox, which shows a
nuanced understanding of the limits of their own FRB/US model:
48 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2002
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the use of large-scale macroeconometric models. However, some constructive
tension always exists between the current specifications of the models and the
staff’s evolving understanding of macroeconomic behavior. Consequently,
even in these activities, judgment remains an important element in our
analysis.15
Sims’ criticisms are also inconsistent with his own observation that the
Federal Reserve reports forecasts under alternative scenarios. The bottom
line is that I believe that users have a better understanding of the limita-
tions of their models than is suggested by the rather insulting anecdotes
reported by Sims. 
The difﬁculties in translating criticisms into practice are illustrated in
the treatment of how to incorporate economic theory into models.
Although Sims frequently suggests that central bank models fail to prop-
erly come to grips with economic theory, his discussion is quite weak in
terms of speciﬁcs, except with regard to how expectations are handled.
Yet in defending his VAR approach to forecasting, Sims states that “it is
not reasonable to suppose that the public would quickly perceive and act
on a shift in policy behavior. The VAR forecasts are therefore likely to be
more reasonable approximations to actual expectations.” It is unclear to
me why the willingness to make assumptions like this places the VAR
approach any closer to consistency with economic theory than the loose
theorizing used to motivate the expectations speciﬁcations in the large-
scale models. In fact, the question of how to best incorporate economic
theory into a forecasting model is very difﬁcult. Does economic theory
suggest that such a model should embody Ricardian equivalence, as
forward-looking rational behavior implies, or should it not, as the pres-
ence of liquidity constraints suggests? The answer is far from obvious and
in any event requires a speciﬁcation of the objectives for which the model
is being used.
In conclusion, this paper falls prey to the same criticism of lack of pol-
icy relevance that it makes of the models and their uses. Issues of the use
of subjective information, accounting for the model, and the like are all at
some level apparently part of the Federal Reserve’s actual procedures in
making and assessing forecasts. The paper’s criticisms thus too often fall
into the area of formalism rather than substance. Policymaking at the
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well and good to point out where an engineering project takes short cuts,
deviates from high theory, and the like. (Theoretical physics is similarly
replete with cases of approximations, normalizations, and other shortcuts
that make mathematicians cringe.) I am certainly willing to believe that,
in principle, formal criticism of this type can be translated into practical
suggestions that allow the models to better assist policymakers. Yet not
all logical defects are equally important in practice. Without some
demonstration of how various identiﬁed ﬂaws affect the actual use of
models in informing policy and providing clear operational guidance on
how to improve the existing large-scale models, the many criticisms made
here are unlikely to have much effect.
Jeffrey C. Fuhrer: I will begin my discussion with some general remarks
about the state of monetary policy models and then turn to some speciﬁc
comments on Christopher Sims’ paper.
The use of models is almost surely unavoidable in policymaking, as it
is in virtually every aspect of life. When I describe my job to my children,
my spouse, and my noneconomist friends, they often ask me something
like, “So what’s with all that modeling stuff?” I usually reply, much to
their delight, that everyone uses models, even in everyday life. For exam-
ple, we all use a “model” of a car when we drive it: we conveniently
abstract from the details of the internal combustion engine, the suspension
and cooling systems, and the physics that links them all together with the
driver, because these aspects of the vehicle are generally unimportant for
everyday driving decisions. This model is so much a part of our lives that
we take for granted that our means of interacting with our cars is a simpli-
ﬁed, processed representation of a far more complex external reality. But
it is through this model that we are able to use and make real-time sense
of an otherwise remarkably complicated machine.
After rousing my involuntary audience from their stupor, I usually con-
tinue by pointing out that this example shares a number of features com-
mon to all models: It simpliﬁes a more complicated reality. It therefore
abstracts from features of reality that may be important in other circum-
stances. The way in which it simpliﬁes reality depends critically upon the
use to which the model is to be put (compare the mechanic’s model of the
car with the driver’s). It imposes some structure on reality that both cap-
tures essential elements of that reality (where what is “essential” is
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statistical or even to mathematical representations.
The same principles apply to economic policymakers and macroeco-
nomic models. In fact, I do not believe there is any coherent way to con-
duct policy without employing some kind of model. The model that
monetary policymakers actually use may not look like the models on
Sims’ website. It might reside entirely between the ears of the current
Federal Reserve chairman. But every policymaker has some way of
imposing a simplifying structure on the complex interactions between
economic actors and economic policy. This structure is both the means by
which the policymaker is able to interpret (that is, identify) the current
economic environment and a tool for considering policy alternatives.
Thus models for policymaking, of one sort or another, are almost surely
unavoidable.
The question then becomes: What kind of models should we use, what
kind of models do we use, and what and how large are the differences
between them? I will focus on the formal models developed by econo-
mists for policy analysis.
In his own comments on other papers, Sims notes that a number of
authors have “examined the last half century or so of US monetary policy,
evaluating how good it has been, whether it has been improving, and what
forces have contributed to its evolution,” but he goes on to caution that
“. . . the apparent lack of consensus on the sources of monetary non-
neutrality, the dependence of conclusions on assumptions about these
sources, and the limited attention to statistical ﬁt in this literature make its
conclusions on these issues at best tentative.”1 I think this sums the matter
up nicely. In other words, the conclusions reached in this literature might
well be interesting, and even useful, if only our profession had reached
the stage where our models were really up to such a task.
But they are not. The gap between the ideal and the practical is large.
So what should a model do? First, it should be based on theory that is
designed to identify underlying household, ﬁrm, and government behav-
ior—objectives and constraints, for lack of better terms—so that we can
both interpret the data in terms of economic behavior and conduct welfare
analysis. Second, the model should be able to pass empirical tests that
determine whether the desired identiﬁcation has been achieved, whether
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model appears to be stable in the presence of modest changes in policy
regime.
What do the models do? Unfortunately, the models that are strongly
linked to theory cannot pass the empirical tests, and the models that pass
some of the empirical tests deviate markedly, and usually in ad hoc fash-
ion, from theory. Instances of the ﬁrst sort are to be found in many acade-
mic papers featuring optimizing policy models. Instances of the second
sort are to be found at many central banks.
Turning ﬁrst to the theory-linked models, most of the extant academic
literature can be reduced to output and price-setting equations of the fol-
lowing form:2
where y, r, π, and x represent the logarithm of output, the real rate of inter-
est, inﬂation, and a driving variable for inﬂation, respectively. The dis-
count rate is β, and γ and σ are positive parameters.
When the output gap is taken as the variable driving inﬂation, and
rational expectations are assumed, these two equations imply no inertia
whatsoever in output or inﬂation beyond what is induced by the nominal
rate of interest.3 Both variables behave like stock prices: they jump in
response to shocks.4 The long and variable lags that seem to characterize
links from monetary policy to output and inﬂation in the data are nowhere
to be found in the models, and any inertial behavior in the economy can
derive only from a perplexingly inertial monetary authority. 
Of course, models with these characteristics have little hope of match-
ing the key dynamic features of U.S. macroeconomic history, as a number
of authors have now demonstrated.5 It is not possible to remedy this deﬁ-
πβ π γ tt t t Ex =+ +1 ,
yE y r tt t t = + βσ 1 –
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2. The output equation is identical to the Euler equation for consumption in a standard
life-cycle/permanent income model with a time-varying real interest rate, as the capital
stock is assumed to be ﬁxed.
3. The same conclusion will be true with marginal cost as the driving variable for inﬂa-
tion, if marginal cost is in turn a purely forward-looking function of state variables.
4. Note that the equations for output and inﬂation are isomorphic to dividend-pricing
models of stock prices.
5. See, for example, Cogley and Nason (1995), Nelson (1998), Estrella and Fuhrer
(2002), and Fuhrer (2000).
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equation.6 If marginal cost is the proper determinant of inﬂation, and it in
turn is determined by a purely forward-looking relation, the resulting
model has exactly the same undesirable properties.
The problem is that the data show considerably more inertia, in both
prices and quantities, than the models imply. Some authors have pro-
posed ad hoc solutions to this problem. For example, some have
suggested that a fraction of price setters or consumers exhibit “rule-of-
thumb” or “backward-looking” behavior.7 But this solution is a capitula-
tion, as it explains all of the persistence in inflation or consumption
changes with machinery that is not derived from the assumed objectives
of consumers or firms.8 The more important these rule-of-thumbers are,
the less structure there is to the structural model into which they are
inserted. The more rule-of-thumbers there are, the less representative is
the utility function of the optimizing consumers, and the less hope we
have of deriving optimal policy from a well-defined social welfare func-
tion, because rule-of-thumbers do not maximize anything but simply fol-
low the rule. Who knows which policies they would prefer?
A host of other authors have turned to habit formation to solve some of
the dynamic models’ problems.9 This approach seems more promising,
but it should be of considerable concern that studies of micro consump-
tion data do not ﬁnd evidence of habit formation.10 This raises the possi-
bility that habit formation in aggregate consumption stands for some other
underlying consumer behavior yet to be identiﬁed. This, too, should raise
concerns about the welfare implications derived from such models.
Many central banks augment models based on pure theory with lags,
either by assuming a fraction of backward-looking agents or by positing
high-order adjustment costs in most sectors of the economy. These aug-
mentations are empirically driven and represent in my view a somewhat
uncomfortable balance between existing theories and the knowledge that
Christopher A. Sims 53
6. As in Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler, and Lopez-Salido (2001).
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ries. If most of the persistence in the model derives from nonoptimizing,
non-theory-based mechanisms, what are we to make of the welfare con-
clusions from these models?
Perhaps as disturbing as the shortage of theoretically sound, empiri-
cally veriﬁed models is the fact that the sources of inﬂation distortions in
aggregate models remain rather murky.11 Within one tradition there is lit-
tle agreement on why money should exist, and therefore little agreement
on how inﬂation acts as a tax on it or distorts its use in one activity or
another. Does money enter the utility function? Is it required in advance
for certain transactions? Does it help us to economize on shopping time?
Another strand of the literature asserts that the price dispersion caused by
the pricing decisions of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms is the source of the
inﬂation distortion. This story, however, derives from an assumed ﬁxity
in ﬁrm pricing behavior that seems hard to justify. In yet another strand,
the modeler simply assumes that the central bank has a distaste for inﬂa-
tion, even though inﬂation causes little or no explicit distortion in the
model. This is the case in the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model. Finally,
in another tradition, the one that I align myself with, all these ways of
modeling inﬂation distortions are viewed with considerable suspicion.
I would conclude, ﬁrst, that the models do not ﬁt the data, and second,
that they do not provide plausible descriptions of the welfare losses that
policy is trying to minimize. The two conclusions are related, of course,
in that models that ﬁt so poorly could not really be good reﬂections of the
underlying objectives of consumers and ﬁrms.
Where does this leave us? In my view, we have a few signiﬁcant chal-
lenges to tackle over the coming decades:
—We should keep the empirical standard for model development quite
high. Estimated Euler equations tell us little about the dynamic properties
of the macroeconomic variables we are trying to understand. We cannot
claim to have identiﬁed macroeconomic relationships unless we have
fully tested their dynamic implications, and that can really be done only
with system methods.
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Lucas and others, that seeks to understand the microeconomic underpin-
nings of macroeconomic regularities. But we need to broaden the scope of
the inquiry beyond small wrinkles in the canonical utility functions and
constraints. Dare I suggest that behavioral economists, or even psycholo-
gists, may possess some wisdom about economic decisionmaking from
which we could beneﬁt? I believe it is time to reexamine the commonly
accepted assumptions regarding utility maximization, proﬁt maximiza-
tion, and formation of expectations that we routinely build into our
macroeconomic models, over and over again.
—Let’s not be in such a rush. Economists seem to be in a hurry to com-
pute optimal policy results from a microfounded model, without ﬁrst
being sure that the model ﬁts the data, has identiﬁed the underlying
behaviors we are looking for, and embodies plausible descriptions of
household and ﬁrm objectives.
In this context Sims’ analysis of the role of models in monetary policy
deliberations in the United States and around the world is useful and inter-
esting. As always, I learned a lot from reading his paper. I agree with
much of what he says, but I have questions about a few of his conclusions.
Sims replicates the ﬁnding of Romer and Romer that the Federal
Reserve’s inﬂation forecasts are superior to private forecasts,12 and he
adds to that analysis by pointing out that “information content” regres-
sions may give a misleading indication of relative forecast performance.
His analysis of possible reasons for the Federal Reserve’s forecasting
edge is a potentially valuable addition to the work of Romer and Romer.
But, as Sims himself suggests, this analysis is not conclusive, and thus
several questions remain. 
First, why is it that the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation forecasts are so
much better than others, but their output forecasts are not?13 This is puz-
zling, because the Federal Reserve relies on forecasting frameworks, both
model-based and judgmental, that link real “gap” variables (unemploy-
ment or output) to inﬂation. The medium-term direction of inﬂation in
these models should largely depend on the current state of the real gap
variables. If, on average, the Federal Reserve’s forecasts of these vari-
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its inﬂation forecasting prowess?
Second, Sims suggests that the Federal Reserve staff’s intensive exam-
ination of “special factors” affords them some short-run advantage. To be
sure, the staff devotes signiﬁcant resources to analyzing the impact of
impending tax, methodological, and relative price changes on aggregate
price indices. But the question is how many of these factors have persis-
tent effects on inﬂation. A good number likely have persistent effects only
on the price level, with transient effects on the inﬂation rate, and thus
should not improve longer-term forecasts. Others, such as the large
swings in oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s, likely did have persis-
tent effects on inﬂation. To the extent that the Federal Reserve staff had a
more accurate view of the effects of oil price developments on inﬂation,
this could have resulted in superior forecast performance. Thus an impor-
tant unresolved question is to what extent the expertise of Federal Reserve
specialists results in better understanding of transient or persistent inﬂu-
ences on inﬂation in this sample.
Third, Sims considers the possibility that the Federal Reserve’s inﬂa-
tion forecasting edge arises from its superior knowledge of the likely
course of its own future policy actions. But regardless of what the staff
knows, the Green Book forecast is not a true “forecast,” but rather a pro-
jection conditioned on an assumed path for the federal funds rate. And in
many if not most of the cases in Sims’ sample, the funds rate path is con-
structed precisely to show what would happen if the funds rate were
unchanged, even when that may not be the prevailing expectation in pri-
vate markets or inside the Federal Reserve itself. This is not to say that the
assumed path never reﬂects the staff’s best forecast of future policy. But
for the many projections that do not condition on the best funds rate fore-
cast, this complicates Sims’ inferences about the sources of forecast
performance.
Finally, on Sims’ methodological points, it is surely true that the policy
process necessarily involves a mixture of judgmental and model inputs,
confronts uncertainty both in constructing analytical frameworks and in
implementing policy, and will thus at some stage be ripe for Bayesian
econometric techniques. But many of the advantages of the Bayesian
techniques that Sims cites apply primarily to the large-model, large-staff
processes currently in place at central banks. My sense is that critical
advances in central bank models and understanding are more likely to be
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mary behavioral relationships at work in the models, as suggested above.
For these models, which impose fairly strict theoretical restrictions, the
problems of instrument reduction and combining subjective judgment
with econometric models do not loom as large. In my judgment, relatively
straightforward classical econometric techniques would have, and indeed
have, allowed us to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful eco-
nomic models of this type.14
Thus the econometric methods that Sims advocates in the paper might
be viewed as reﬁnements of a model that already has cleared the hurdles
of incorporating well-identiﬁed and data-consistent microfoundations. As
a result, it may be too early in the development of monetary policy mod-
els to make best use of these Bayesian techniques. When monetary policy
models have matured substantially, I would imagine that Sims’ sugges-
tions will be valuable enhancements to model design and implementation
at central banks.
General discussion: Several panelists commented on the way models are
used in the policymaking process. Benjamin Friedman agreed with Sims
that the small ECB models focusing on money were not the rationale for
the second pillar of the ECB, but rather that the ECB wanted a second pil-
lar for independent reasons. The models were built in order to support the
second pillar. In Willem Buiter’s view the only reliable parts of the Bank
of England’s model were the accounting identities. However, he thought
the model still served a useful role as a framework for discussions and in
guaranteeing a minimum level of consistency. The model forced the mon-
etary policy committee and staff to express their views in a coherent
way—one could not forecast output growth of 4 percent along with a
3 percent increase in hours worked and 5 percent productivity growth.
Although the models did assist in making intelligent guesses about the
future course of the economy, they did not play a systematic role in
preparing forecasts. Indeed, at the Bank of England the model was
adjusted to ﬁt what the committee and staff thought was a reasonable pro-
jection, even to the extent of eliminating whole equations. In the same
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scale models were not primarily used for forecasting but for facilitating
discussions among policymakers. He believed the model simulations
showing different ways in which the economy might unfold were very
useful. He noted that although the staff sometimes attach probabilities to
these scenarios, policymakers alone decide how they use this information. 
William Nordhaus observed that although the four central banks Sims
examined have very different cultures, all rely on teams of sectoral experts.
Results of some studies suggested that, in the United States, the experts
outperformed the large models, and Nordhaus conjectured that this largely
reﬂected their ability to react faster to crises and structural changes. One
episode in which this appeared to have happened was the fall in oil prices
in 1986. Experts’ use of simple sectoral models allows a high degree of
ﬂexibility. These models can be easily adjusted to new situations, whereas
much more effort is needed to adapt complex simultaneous-equations
models in a similar way. Hence decentralization and specialization are
both justiﬁed and likely to improve performance. Nordhaus noted that in
other areas, such as climate and environmental modeling, delegation of
this kind is common. Ben Bernanke agreed with the view that experts have
a tremendous amount of information at the microeconomic or sectoral
level and that information aggregation is central to successful forecasting.
So, for short-term forecasting, a very limited amount of structure might
indeed be optimal. 
Olivier Blanchard agreed with Sims that Bayesian methods should be
used more widely. But he wondered whether the key to solving problems
with the existing models really lies in substituting Bayesian for non-
Bayesian econometrics. He described four criticisms levied at the MPS
model that were not related to econometric methodology. He thought
most of these criticisms could be dealt with, and that the resulting model
would be superior to the current U.S. and Canadian models. One of these
criticisms was that the MPS model was prone to explosive behavior.
Blanchard believed that a modest amount of additional structure would
solve this problem, giving the model a balanced growth path while retain-
ing the informational advantages of using experts for various sectors. A
second criticism was that the original model’s treatment of expectations
was inadequate. That has been resolved, and we now know how to esti-
mate equations explicitly incorporating expectations and how to do simu-
lations with rational expectations. A third criticism was the imposition of
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any variable that could affect expectations. Blanchard thought this prob-
lem had been oversold and that, after controlling for expectations, zero
restrictions can reasonably be imposed in many variables. A fourth criti-
cism, which Jeffrey Fuhrer had emphasized in his comment, is that the
model’s equations, particularly those relating to dynamics, lacked theo-
retical justiﬁcation. Conversely, the dynamics delivered by theory often
do not match the dynamics observed in the data. Blanchard saw no imme-
diate way to avoid using ad hoc dynamics until more-adequate theory is
developed. He agreed that doing so inhibits formal welfare evaluations,
but he did not see this as a fatal ﬂaw. Minimization of the variance of out-
put is a legitimate objective of policy, and a model with an ad hoc but
realistic speciﬁcation of dynamics is a useful tool for that purpose. 
Friedman supported Sims’ view that the Lucas critique was not very
important at the one- or two-year horizons that are of most concern to pol-
icymakers. He believed that within this time frame it is reasonable to
assume that the public neither perceives nor adapts to a shift in policy
regime. He thought it made little difference whether the monetary author-
ity says “This is what we’re going to do in this situation” or “We are
henceforth going to have a rule that says this is what we are going to do
every time we are in this situation.” 
Reifschneider observed that any discussion about changing the models
should also include a cost-beneﬁt analysis and a recognition of the limited
resources available to central banks. He noted that staff at the Federal
Reserve are aware of the many shortcomings of the models under discus-
sion. But a great many people already work full time on the models,
because model building and maintenance remain a complex task. To
implement all the suggestions he had heard, the Federal Reserve’s human
resources devoted to this work would have to be increased dramatically.
Other central banks, which typically have much smaller staffs than the
Federal Reserve, are in an even more difﬁcult position. Complicating this
resource problem is a lack of support from the academic community,
which has largely abandoned large-scale modeling. He hoped that this
would change and that academic economists would turn to providing
practical assistance to central banks in their modeling work. 
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